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ABSTRACT

Communication consumes the majority of a wireless sensor network’s limited
energy. There are several ways to reduce the communication cost. Two approaches
used in this work are clustering and in-network aggregation. The choice of a cluster
head within each cluster is important because cluster heads use additional energy for
their responsibilities and that burden needs to be carefully distributed. We introduce
the energy constrained minimum dominating set (ECDS) to model the problem of
optimally choosing cluster heads in the presence of energy constraints. We show its
applicability to sensor networks and give an approximation algorithm of O(log n) for
solving the ECDS problem. We propose a distributed algorithm for the constrained
dominating set which runs in O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability. We show
experimentally that the distributed algorithm performs well in terms of energy usage,
node lifetime, and clustering time and thus is very suitable for wireless sensor
networks. Using aggregation in wireless sensor networks is another way to reduce
the overall communication cost. However, changes in security are necessary when innetwork aggregation is applied. Traditional end-to-end security is not suitable for use
with in-network aggregation. A corrupted sensor has access to the intermediate data
and can falsify results. Additively homomorphic encryption allows for aggregation of
encrypted values, with the result being the same as the result as if unencrypted data
were aggregated. Using public key cryptography, digital signatures can be used to
achieve integrity. We propose a new algorithm using homomorphic encryption and
additive digital signatures to achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability for innetwork aggregation in wireless sensor networks. We prove that our digital signature
algorithm which is based on Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
is at least as secure as ECDSA. Even without in-network aggregation, security is a
challenge in wireless sensor networks. In wireless sensor networks, not all messages
need to be secured with the same level of encryption. We propose a new algorithm
which provides adequate levels of security while providing much higher availablility
than other security protocols. Our approach uses similar amounts of energy as a
network without security.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor motes are small, battery powered computing devices.

For

example, the Crossbow MICAz motes consist of a CPU, an on-board radio and a
sensor-board. The CPU runs from a 128kB flash memory and has 512kB memory for
sensor readings. The radio is an IEEE 802.15.4 radio and offers high speed (250 kbps)
communication [?]. A wide variety of sensor-boards are available for the motes. The
sensor-boards include, but are not limited to, seismic activity, temperature, humidity
and light. This enables the motes to monitor their environment in a variety of ways.
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are self-organizing networks of motes. They
are used to monitor the environment for events such as forest fires or enemy troop
movements. A large number of motes are spread over the area to be monitored. Upon
activation, the motes self-organize into a network, which connects to the users via a
powerful base station in order to achieve a common goal [?]. As each mote surveys
the area within its sensing range, the data is sent towards the base station along a
multi-hop path. A WSN is able to remotely cover a large sensing area since these
low-cost motes organize into a multi-hop network without human assistance.
The lifetime of a WSN is limited. Each MICAz mote is powered by two AA
batteries. The motes can operate under various settings, including active listening
mode, sleep mode and idle mode. The average lifespan of a mote which has a random
activity pattern is nine months [1]. Under normal circumstances, it will not be feasible
to replace used batteries in motes. In order to extend the lifetime of the WSN, energy
saving techniques must be applied.
Communication via the on-board radio is the most expensive operation for the
sensor nodes [2]. Protocols such as LEACH [3], TOPDISC [4] and HEED [?] reduce
energy consumption and increase the lifetime of the network. The basic idea in these
protocols is to cluster sensors into groups, so that sensors communicate only to their
cluster head. The cluster heads then communicate the aggregated information to the
processing center. Clustering has been shown to greatly reduce power consumption,
is easily scalable, and is robust in case of node failures [3]. A good clustering scheme
is one that takes into account one or more of the following: communication range,
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Figure 1.1. Motivating Example

number and type of sensors, geographical location and remaining energy. Clustering
and proper cluster head selection in order to maximize the lifetime of the network
is an important consideration when designing protocols and algorithms for sensor
networks.
In-network aggregation in WSN is another approach that allows for a large
savings of energy. In in-network aggregation, intermediate results are calculated along
the multi-hop path whenever two or more messages are routed along the same path.
Depending on the routing structure, energy savings may be by as much as eight
times [3]. Consider the network depicted in Figure 1.1. Without aggregation, a total
of 9+12+13 = 34 messages are sent; with aggregation, only 9+3+1 = 13 messages are
sent. Through the sample network in Figure 1.1 it is clear that in-network aggregation
greatly reduces the number of messages sent in a WSN, which leads to large energy
savings. In-network aggregation and clustering algorithms can be used in conjunction;
many aggregation algorithms naturally build upon the clustered network. Clustering
and aggregation algorithms combine the necessary energy savings that will ensure a
long network lifetime.
Most wireless sensor network applications are deployed in environments which
can affect the motes.

The effects of wind, rain, heat or sand on the motes is

unpredictable. Sensor networks may be used in hostile environments and be subject
to attacks by enemies.

An attacker may be able to gain physical access to a

sensor node and introduce nodes into the network or simply inject messages into the
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communication channel. Due to such manipulation by an attacker, a sensor network
may generate incorrect readings or aggregates. Corrupted or spurious sensors may fail
to participate in the common tasks of a sensor network. In secure situations sensors
may be corrupted due to the physical effects of wind, rain, or heat. Water could
penetrate the physical housing and cause the CPU to generate incorrect readings or
calculate an aggregate incorrectly.
Security in WSNs includes confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality in sensor networks is accomplished by preventing outsiders from eavesdropping
on transmissions. Integrity implies that any aggregate result is made up of only
legitimate data without faulty inclusions or additions, and also that internal,
corrupted sensors cannot interfere with operations. Availability in sensor networks
is of great concern to the user of the network. Any useful sensor protocol needs to
ensure that the generated data reaches the user in a timely manner. Unfortunately,
many existing security primitives cannot be used in sensor networks, either because
the computing power of the sensors is too limited or the additional work created by
the protocols causes excessive network traffic [?].
Security is even more of a challenge in WSNs when in-network aggregation
is utilized. A corrupted sensor may appear to participate in the mission of the
network but falsify sensor readings, improperly apply an aggregation function, exclude
legitimate messages from the aggregate result or create a fictitious result. A sensor
corrupted by an attacker may behave in this way in order to get the base station to
accept an incorrect result that is favorable to the attacker. Hence in order to secure
data aggregation in a sensor network, we must not only provide protection against
eavesdroppers, but we should also prevent intermediate sensors from having access to
the data.
This dissertation is organized as follows. First, a thorough review of the current
literature on clustering and secure data aggregation. Next we introduce the “Energy
Constrained Clustering” in Paper 1. We expand on clustering with Paper 2, which
gives several extensions to the original ECDS algorithm. In Paper 3 we present a
practical algorithm for data security (PADS) in wireless sensor networks. The last
paper, Paper 4 introduces a novel way of proving aggregate digital signatures in
wireless sensor networks.
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1. CLUSTERING
Existing work on clustering algorithms can be classified into several categories:
k-hop-cluster formation, where each node is at most k hops from its cluster head,
connected dominating set (CDS) and weakly connected dominating set (WCDS)
based algorithms, and general clustering algorithms.

2.1.1. DOMINATING SET
A connected dominating set based clustering algorithm enables the cluster
heads to communicate directly with each other. This allows for a virtual back-bone
formation in the network. In applications in which the cluster heads need to be able
to work together to complete a task, connected dominating sets offer an advantage.
The weakly connected dominating set slightly relaxes the requirement of connected
cluster heads and allows them to be, at most, k-hops away from the next cluster head.
The work presented in [5, 6, 7, ?, 8] are examples of connected and weakly connected
dominating set algorithms.
The algorithm HEED presented in [?] selects cluster heads according to residual
energy and node proximity to neighbors or node degree. HEED uses several fixed level
of transmission power levels. One level is used to communicate with intra-cluster
nodes and another is used by cluster heads to communicate with other cluster heads.
A cluster head aggregates the data and sends it via other cluster heads to the base
station. Messages are send toward the base station and can be forwarded by any
node, not just the cluster heads.
In [5], a series of approximation algorithms for finding a small, weakly-connected
dominating set (WCDS) in a given graph is presented for use in clustering mobile
ad hoc networks. The main contribution of the work is a completely distributed
algorithm for finding small WCDS. The performance of the algorithm is shown to be
very close to that of the centralized approach.
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In [6], the authors provide three approximation algorithms for the minimum
connected dominating set (MCDS) in mobile ad hoc networks. The algorithms provide
P∆
approximation guarantees of 2H(∆) + 1 and 2H(∆), where H(∆) =
i=1 1/i ≤
ln ∆ + 1. The guarantee of c + 1, applies to graphs where the maximum degree is ∆
and c is some constants such that ∆ ≤ c.
The connected minimum dominating set is considered in [7].

The authors

provide two approximation algorithms which achieve approximation factors of
2H(∆) + 2 and H(∆) + 2, where ∆ is the maximum degree in the graph and H
is the harmonic function. The authors also consider the traveling tourist problem
and the Steiner CDS and provide the corresponding approximation algorithms.
Several distributed poly-logarithmic time algorithms are presented in [8]. The
algorithms compute connected and weakly connected dominating sets with an
approximation factor of O(log ∆), where ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph.
The authors also show distributed algorithms to construct low-stretch dominating
sets. A low-stretch dominating set is one in which every pair of nodes has dominators
of no more then O(log n).

2.1.2. GENERAL CLUSTERING
In [9], cluster heads are chosen so that the energy consumption over the entire
network is even, ensuring that the network lives as long as possible. A fixed number
of cluster head candidates are selected and the cluster heads with the most residual
energy are chosen from that set. A node will chose a cluster head to ensure the overall
energy consumption in the entire network is even.
In [10], a new, fully distributed approximation algorithm based on LP relaxation
techniques is presented. For an arbitrary parameter k and maximum degree ∆, the
algorithm computes a dominating set of expected size O(k∆2/k log ∆ |DSOP T |) in
O(k 2 ) rounds where each node has to send O(k 2 ∆) messages of size O(log ∆). This
is the first algorithm that achieved a non-trivial approximation ratio in a constant
number of rounds.
The work described in [11] is a primal-dual based distributed algorithm for the
weighted, capacitated vertex cover problem. In [11] the each vertex is assigned a
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weight, as well as a capacity, and the goal is to minimize the sum of the weights
without exceeding the capacity of any vertex. The authors provide a (2 + ) OP T
approximation algorithm. Additionally the running time of the algorithm is shown
to be O (log (nW ) /), where n is the number of nodes and W = wtmax /wtmin is the
ratio of the largest weight to the smallest weight.
A randomized distributed algorithm is presented in [12]. The algorithm runs
in O(log n log ∆ + 1) rounds and the size of the dominating set obtained has a high
probability of being within O(log n) of the optimal. Each round has a constant
number of messages that are exchanged among neighbors. The authors also cover a
generalization to the weighted dominating set and as well as the case in which each
node is required to be covered by multiple nodes.

2.1.3. K-HOP CLUSTERING
The work in [13, 14, 15] features k-cluster algorithms. After the algorithm is
executed, each node is either a cluster head or at most k-hops from its cluster head.
In [13], an identity-based heuristic to form k-clusters in wireless ad-hoc networks
is presented in which d is a parameter. When the heuristic terminates, a node is either
a cluster head or, at most, k hops away from its cluster head. This heuristic extends
its former ones which restricted themselves to 1-hop clusters, thus helping to reduce
the number of cluster heads.
A fast, distributed algorithm is presented in [15]. It is used to compute a small
k-dominating set D (for any fixed k) and its induced graph partition (which breaks the
graph into radius k clusters centered around the vertices of D). The time complexity
of the algorithm is O(k log∗ n) where log∗ is the inverse Ackermann function.
For the special family of graphs that represent ad hoc wireless networks modeled
as unit disk graphs, [14] introduces a two phase distributed polynomial time and
message complexity k-clustering approximation solution with O(k) worst case ratio
over the optimal solution.
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2.2. IN-NETWORK AGGREGATION
Once the sensor network is properly clustered, the sensor nodes can work on
achieving their goal of securely transmitting data to the base station. Existing work
on data security in wireless sensor networks can be classified based on the number
of aggregators that are supported. Some algorithms support only one aggregator,
the base station. In this case data are securely transmitted to the base station,
which applies the aggregation function. By using end-to-end security, in which each
packet is secured by the sender and can only be deciphered by the base station, total
security is provided. However, this security is provided at a high communication cost
of O(N log N ) at best and O(N 2 ) at worst depending on the topology of the network.
Other algorithms provide for multiple aggregators, a subset of the sensor nodes
in the network. Additionally, it is possible to distinguish between multiple aggregators
on the same level of the hierarchy and multiple aggregators on multiple levels of
the hierarchy. In order to accomplish data aggregation, the data are no longer
encrypted end-to-end, but rather hop-by-hop. Data confidentiality now needs to
include assurance to the base station and the sending nodes that the data were
included in the aggregate result. Data integrity must now mean that the data were
included as-is, an assurance that the aggregate was calculated from exactly the inputs,
nothing more, and nothing less, without modification to the inputs.
Clustering algorithms, where the cluster head aggregates the information in its
cluster prior to sending the aggregate information to the base station, are an example
of a multiple aggregator, single level algorithm. Depending on the number of hops
the cluster head is away from the base station, a clustered aggregation algorithm can
provide for large savings in the communication costs over base station aggregation.
A tree hierarchy in which each node combines its own reading with those of its
descendants is an example of a multiple aggregator, multiple level algorithm. Multiple
aggregators at multiple levels of the structure lead to the largest energy savings. Each
node may receive multiple transmissions but will only send one message to its parents.
However, multiple aggregators at multiple levels also have the highest security risk
because each aggregator may malfunction and corrupt the aggregate result.
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2.2.1. SINGLE AGGREGATOR
The development of TinySec was an important first step toward providing
security in wireless sensor networks [16]. TinySec showed that while sensors have
limited processing abilities, they are capable of applying adequate levels of security.
TinySec implemented public key cryptography using SkipJack or RC5 and link-layer
security. TinySec uses an 8-byte key and can be used either as hop-by-hop or endto-end security. If hop-by-hop security is used, then no guarantees can be made
regarding compromised aggregators. If end-to-end security is used, then aggregation
is only possible at the receiving point.

However, TinySec is important because

many of the approaches that have followed it rely on encryption/decryption within
their algorithms.

The simulations performed with networks of 36 nodes during

the development of TinySec showed that TinySec adds a 10% overhead in energy
consumption, latency and bandwidth utilization.
Single aggregator models provide total security for confidentiality, integrity,
and availability by employing end-to-end security. This gives the base station the
knowledge that every sensed value received has been included in the calculation
because intermediate nodes cannot modify the values in transit. However, availability
may suffer because each node contributes its own reading and forwards any messages
received, depending on the layout of the network, nodes at higher levels of the
hierarchy will expend large amounts of energy to forward messages. In the worst
case, the sensors are in a straight line, each with one parent and at most one child.
Each node will transmit one more message than it received, and the last node will
transmit N messages, where N is the number of nodes in the network. The total
number of messages transmitted will be bound by O(N 2 ). At best, each sensor will
be able to transmit directly to the base station, incurring a communication cost of
O(N ) at most. The edge complexity can be as high as O(N ) or as low as O(1) for
either of the extremes, with a typical sensor network somewhere in between. Edge
complexity refers to the maximum messages sent along a single edge.
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2.2.2. MULTIPLE AGGREGATORS
A single-level multi-aggregator algorithm allows for multiple aggregators. Each
aggregator sends its aggregate result to the base station. A clustered topology is an
example of such a setup. The cluster head calculates the aggregate for its cluster
and then communicates that result to the base station. The base station takes that
information from all the cluster heads and calculates the total aggregate for the
entire network. Such a setup is also useful in sensor networks with reactive sensing
capabilities. Instead of generating a steady stream of data, reactive sensor networks
send data only in response to an event; often only a few regions of the network are
active at any given time. Clustered topologies allow for aggregates to be calculated
in the affected regions and the result communicated to the base station.
The authors in [17] proposed the use of interactive proofs to force the aggregator
to show that the calculated aggregate is a good approximation of the true value.
Three phases are involved in the aggregate-commit-prove (ACP) protocol. During
the first phase, the aggregator collects the data and computes the aggregate result.
The aggregator is able to verify the authenticity of each message because a shared
key exists between the aggregator and each other node. During the second phase, the
aggregator calculates a commitment, which is used during the third phase to prove
that the aggregate is valid. The base station checks to see if the aggregator is cheating
by observing whether the result received from the aggregator is close to the correct
result aggregated from the committed data. This approach has an overall message
complexity of O(3N ) and an edge complexity of O(1/2N ), depending on how many
nodes the base station queries to verify the commitment.
In SecureDAV, the authors proposed a secure data Aggregation and Verification
Protocol using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and a threshold digital signature
scheme (EC-DSA) [18, ?]. SecureDAV is a two-part protocol. During the initial phase,
each cluster generates a secret cluster key using verifiable secret sharing (VSS). At
the end of the protocol, each sensor in a cluster will have a share of the secret cluster
key. Because each node has only a share of the cluster key, the cluster key cannot be
determined by an attacker. The secret cluster key is used to digitally sign messages
to the base station, which can verify the signature using the corresponding public key.
In a threshold signature scheme, the signatures generated by each holder of a share
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are combined into a full signature, which is equivalent to a signature with the full key
by a single signer. In the second part of the protocol, each sensor sends its reading
to the cluster head. The cluster head calculates the average and then broadcasts the
average to all nodes in the cluster. Each node checks to see if the average is within
a small threshold of its own reading. If the test passes, then the sensor signs the
average with its share of the signature and sends the partial signature to the cluster
head. The cluster head combines the signatures into a full signature and sends the
average along with the signature to the base station. The base station can verify the
signature using the public key, and thus it is assured that the average is acceptable
to the sensor nodes in the cluster. To provide data integrity, a Merkle Hash Tree is
generated by the cluster head from the encrypted readings of the sensors, the base
station uses the Merkle Hash Tree and repeated queries to the cluster head to verify
integrity. The major limitation of SecureDAV is that it is designed to work only with
the calculation of the average. Calculating any other function, such as the SUM is
impossible using this protocol, because a node will be unable to tell if its reading has
been added to the sum. This algorithm has an overall message complexity of O(3N )
and an edge complexity of O(1/2N ), again, depending on how many messages are
necessary for the base station to verify the integrity of the result.

2.2.3. HIERARCHICAL AGGREGATION
Multiple aggregators at multiple levels of the hierarchy will lead to the biggest
savings over aggregation at the base station. Consider Figure 2.2, in which no
aggregation will result in a total of 42 messages sent in the entire network, 14 of
which will be the edge complexity cost on the link to the base station. Opportunistic
aggregation will result in 14 messages sent, one from each node.

The edge

complexity cost in the entire network is 1. Clearly, hierarchical aggregation results in
overwhelming communication costs savings and also has very good edge complexity
costs. However, the security in hierarchical aggregation is very much a challenge.
The base station now needs to be assured that each and every aggregator correctly
computed the aggregate. Each sensor needs to know that its reading was properly
carried through all levels of aggregation. Additionally, in corruption due to attacks,
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Figure 2.2. A sample hierarchical sensor network

several aggregators may decide to collude together to overcome the restrictions of the
algorithms.
In [19], the authors presented a secure aggregation algorithm, which is secure
against injected nodes and compromised nodes. The algorithm delays aggregation by
one level in the hierarchy. A node sends its data secured with a message authentication
code (MAC) to its parent at level i-1. The parent computes the aggregate result and
sends it, plus the data received from the children, to its parent at level i-2. It retains
a copy of the original data along with the MAC. The nodes at level i-2 can now also
calculate the same aggregate as the nodes at level i-1, thus ensuring that the nodes
at level i-1 correctly computed the result. This process of sending the calculated
result along with the data that went into the calculation continues until the data
reach the base station. The algorithm also employs delayed authentication using
µTESLA [20], which means that the base station reveals the appropriate keys after
a delay. The nodes can then use these keys to verify the authenticity of the MACs
received from their descendants. However this algorithm does not provide any security
against colluding nodes at different levels of the hierarchy. If a node at level i-1 and
a node at level i-2 collude to falsify an aggregate result, then this algorithm does not

12

provide protection. However, it does provide for multiple levels of aggregation, and
no limitations exist on the types of aggregates that can be computed. The overall
message complexity for this approach is O(N ) with an edge complexity of O(1);
however, colluding nodes can defeat this algorithm.
Chan et al. first defined a direct data injection attack, in which an attacker
controls any number of sensors and causes them to submit a value that is different
from the sensed value to the in-network aggregation process [21]. They introduced an
algorithm that is secure against aggregator misbehavior in the sense that an attacker
cannot deviate the resulting aggregate any more than would be possible with a direct
data injection attack. This means that an adversary cannot gain an advantage by
controlling an aggregating node over controlling nodes that only input their data.
This algorithm will work with any arbitrary tree topology and is able to cope with
any number of malicious nodes. The algorithm is explained in detail for a SUM
aggregation, but it is also shown how a similar approach would work with MEDIAN,
COUNT, and AVERAGE aggregation. The message complexity for this approach
is O(log2 N ), while the edge complexity is bounded by O(log2 N ). The algorithm
works by building a commitment structure on the aggregate and by decoupling
the physical communication network from a logical aggregation network. Instead
of relying solely on the base station for result checking as in [17], the result checking
is fully distributed and becomes part of the responsibilities of each sensor node. The
base station distributes the final commitment to the network. After receiving the
partial commitments from off-path nodes, a node is able to verify that its inputs
were correctly applied. The node then informs the base station whether it agrees
with the aggregate. The major disadvantage of this approach is that while the edge
complexity is only O(log2 N ), the overall communication complexity of this approach
is O(N log2 N ). Additionally, this approach will only work on certain aggregate
functions.
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Abstract— Using partitioning in wireless sensor networks to create clusters
for routing, data management, and other protocols has been proven as a way to
ensure scalability and to deal with sensor network shortcomings such as limited
communication ranges and energy. Choosing a cluster head within each cluster is
important because cluster heads use additional energy for their responsibilities and
that burden needs to be carefully passed around. Many existing protocols either
choose cluster heads randomly or use nodes with the highest remaining energy. We
introduce the energy constrained minimum dominating set (ECDS) to model the
problem of optimally choosing cluster heads with energy constraints. We show its
applicability to sensor networks and give an approximation algorithm of O(log n) for
solving the ECDS problem. We propose a distributed algorithm for the constrained
dominating set which runs in O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability.

We

experimentally show that the distributed algorithm performs well in terms of energy
usage, node lifetime, and clustering time and, thus, is very suitable for wireless sensor
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless network consists of a large number of small sensors with low-power
transceivers.

These sensors are an effective tool for gathering data for a variety of

purposes, such as border protection, surveillance of forests for fire, and tracking of animal
movements. The data collected by each sensor is communicated via a multi-hop path in the
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network to a single processing center, the base station. The base station uses all reported
data to determine the characteristics of the environment or detect an event.
Communication via the on-board radio is the most expensive operation of the sensor
nodes [1]. In radio communications, the signal strength decreases proportional to the square
of the propagation distance [2]. In other words, to have the same signal strength reach twice
the distance, four times the amount of energy is required. Protocols such as LEACH [3],
and those described in [4] and [5] reduce energy consumption and increase the lifetime
of the network. The basic idea in these protocols is to cluster sensors into groups and to
choose a cluster head such that sensors communicate only to their cluster head. The cluster
heads then communicate the aggregated information to the processing center. Clustering
has been shown to greatly reduce power consumption, is easily scalable, and is robust in the
face of node failures [3]. A good clustering scheme takes into account one or more of the
following: communication range, number and type of sensors, geographical location, and
remaining energy [6]. Clustering and proper cluster head selection in order to maximize
the lifetime of the network are important considerations when designing protocols and
algorithms for sensor networks [7].
A sensor network can be expressed as a graph G = (V, E), where each of the vertices
represents a sensor node and there is an edge between two vertices if their corresponding
sensor nodes are within each other’s communication range. A dominating set of a graph
G = (V, E) is a subset V 0 ⊆ V such that each x ∈ V − V 0 has a neighbor in V 0 . The
assignment of nodes to cluster heads is often modeled as a dominating set (DS) problem [8].
The minimum dominating set problem is NP-complete for general graphs [9] and remains
NP-complete for planar graphs, unit disk graphs, bi-partite graphs, and chordal graphs, but
it does admit a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for planar graphs and unit
disk graphs [10]. The dominating set problem models the optimization problem of finding
a small number of cluster heads.
Clustering in sensor networks and in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) benefits
from using a dominating set approach. The dominating set approach leads to better
clustering because dominating set based clustering can be executed in a constant number
of rounds [11]. A DS based approach works because every node in the network is
either a dominating node or is only one hop from a dominating node [12]. Single-hop
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Fig. 1. Energy Constrained Clustering Example: (a) Original Network (b) Without
Constraints After One Round (c) With Constraints After One Round (d) With Constraints
After Two Rounds

communications within clusters is appropriate because most nodes will be close to their
cluster head and their links are of good quality [13].
Cluster heads spend additional energy on message transmission, so a small set of
cluster heads might not be optimal from a network survivability standpoint. For instance,
using a dominating set as the set q of cluster heads comes with the disadvantage that the
network might lose a few cluster heads and become fragmented fairly soon. Consider the
graph shown in Figure 1. Let’s assume that one unit is used for each receive or send and
the nodes in the dominating set combine all received data into one outgoing message. Each
node has the same amount of energy (7 units) (Figure 1(a)) at the beginning. The optimal
dominating set is one node (Figure 1(b)), however the network will become disconnected
after only one time step. On the other hand a slightly non-optimal dominating set using
the heuristic “Don’t give a cluster head more than three nodes” results in a network that
survives two time steps as shown in Figures 1(c) and 1(d) (the shaded nodes represent the
cluster heads).
A wireless sensor has many constraints, energy being one of the important ones.
Other constraints include bandwidth, storage and computational abilities. A wireless sensor
networks needs to consider these and other constraints when choosing cluster heads and
assigning nodes to clusters. For example, each node sends one packet per round to its
cluster head. The length of a round is limited; this limits the number of nodes a cluster
head can support. Additionally, a cluster head has to store received messages until they
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are combined at the end of each round; this also limits how many nodes a cluster head can
support. For this work, we have chosen to concentrate on the limited energy available to
each sensor and the natural limitations on the size of each cluster that follow.
Motivated by the above examples, we introduce the energy constrained minimum
dominating set of a graph in order to achieve these objectives. The contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• We introduce and define the Energy Constrained Dominating Set (ECDS) Problem
in Section II.
• We describe the problem of developing clusters so that the energy consumption
during each round of processing is minimized without exhausting the available
resources of any given node. In the energy constrained DS problem, we are given
integer constraints on each node that denote the maximum number of relay links a
node can handle if it is chosen as a cluster head. The objective is to minimize the size
of the cluster head set subject to the constraint that no node has more work then it
can handle and that every node is either in the constrained DS or one hop from such
a node. We give a centralized algorithm in Section IV.
• Since the clustering algorithm typically runs repeatedly (for example, when nodes
move or a cluster heads dies, a distributed algorithm is much more practical than a
centralized algorithm. We give a practical distributed algorithm in Section V.
• We prove that the distributed algorithm runs in O(log n log ∆) rounds with high
probability, where ∆ is the maximum degree of a node in the graph. We provide
the proof in Section VI.
• We support our theoretical analysis with extensive simulations using TOSSIM.
We compare the performance of the distributed ECDS algorithm to the HEED
algorithm [14]. HEED selects cluster heads according to residual energy and with
node proximity to neighbors or node degree. Our protocol uses local information
about the connectivity of each node and the connectivity of its neighbors in addition
to the residual energy to decide which node should become a cluster head. ECDS
takes less time and fewer rounds to cluster the network, allowing more messages to
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reach the base station. For the scenarios in our study, ECDS clustering takes 3.5
rounds or less, compared to 4.5 rounds or less for HEED. The number of cluster
heads is as expected and the number of nodes in each cluster remains steady. Our
algorithm results in very few single node clusters. The number of cluster heads, the
size of the clusters and the number of clusters which contain only the cluster head are
much better in ECDS then in HEED. The lifetime of the sensor network, measured
in terms of time of first node death and time of last node death, is better in ECDS
then in HEED. While the overall energy consumption is slightly higher for ECDS,
when considering that ECDS produces more useful data, the energy consumption per
message is much lower. The results of said simulation are available in Section VII.

II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
This section describes the notations used in the rest of the paper and defines the
dominating set, network clustering, and energy constrained connected dominating set.
Definition 2.1: For a graph G and a subset S of the vertex set V (G), denote by NG [S]
the set of vertices in G which are in S or adjacent to a vertex in S. If NG [S] = V (G), then
S is said to be a dominating set of G.
Definition 2.2: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E), and, for each vi ∈ V (G), a
constraint r(vi ) ∈ N, the energy-constrained dominating set (ECDS) of G is a pair (S, C),
where C is an assignment from x ∈ S to Vx ⊆ V such that (a) {Vx |x ∈ S} is a partition of
V , (b) for each x ∈ S, x ∈ Vx ⊆ NG [{x}], and (c) for each x ∈ S, kVx k ≤ r(x) + 1.
In the definition of ECDS, we assume that when a node is selected as a cluster head, it
includes itself in the cluster. (See part (b) of the definition.) Also note from the “+1” in
condition (c) that we allow a node to cover itself for free. That is, the constraint r(x) for x
denotes the maximum number of nodes that x can cover in addition to itself.
ECDS is also related to, but different from, the Network Clustering problem [15].
ECDS has a constraint parameter that is not present in Network Clustering. Also, the
clusters must form a partition in ECDS, whereas they may overlap in the Network
Clustering problem.

The general dominating set can be described as a constrained

dominating set where each constraint is equal to n, the number of nodes in the graph.
It trivially follows that the constrained minimum dominating set is NP-complete. The
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minimum dominating set in the general form has approximation algorithms of within
1 + log kV k. Since the constrained dominating set problem is a special case of the general
dominating set problem, no improvement on these bounds will be possible.
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) coverage generally means ensuring that the
entire area has proper sensor distribution to ensure even sensing. In this work, we define
coverage as one node’s ability to handle the relaying of messages to and from other nodes
in its cluster.
III. RELATED WORK
In [16], cluster heads are chosen so that the energy consumption over the entire
network is even, ensuring that the network lives as long as possible. A node will chose
a cluster head to ensure the overall energy consumption in the entire network is even.
Our algorithm, on the other hand, requires only local information about the topology and
residual energy.
In [17] each vertex is assigned a weight, as well as a capacity, and the goal is to
minimize the sum of the weights without exceeding the capacity of any vertex. The authors
provide a (2 + ) OP T approximation algorithm.
A randomized distributed algorithm that runs in O(log n log ∆ + 1) rounds and where
the size of the dominating set obtained is, with high probability, within O(log n) of the
optimal, is presented in [18]. Our distributed algorithm is based on this algorithm and
extends its ideas to vertices with constraints and applies it to wireless sensor networks.
A fast, distributed algorithm is presented in [19]. It is used to compute a small kdominating set D (for any fixed k) and its induced graph partition. The time complexity of
the algorithm is O(k log∗ n), where log∗ is the inverse Ackermann function.
In [20], a series of approximation algorithms for finding a small, weakly-connected
dominating set (WCDS) in a given graph is presented for use in clustering mobile ad hoc
networks. The main contribution of the work is a completely distributed algorithm for
finding small WCDS. Our work focuses on wireless sensor networks and creates connected
dominating sets.
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The connected minimum dominating set is considered in [21]. The authors provide
two approximation algorithms which achieve approximation factors of 2H(∆) + 2 and
H(∆) + 2 where ∆ is the maximum degree in the graph and H is the harmonic function.
IV. CENTRALIZED ALGORITHM
We now describe a centralized algorithm for the constraint dominating set problem.
A general overview of Algorithm 1 follows. The input is an undirected graph G = (V, E)
and constraints r(v) for each v ∈ V . V 0 ⊆ V , the set of vertices dominating the graph, is
initially empty.
Many applications of sensor networks occur in heterogeneous networks, where the
sensor have the support of several powerful computers in addition to the base station. The
centralized version of the algorithm corresponds to a sensor network in those settings.
Each vertex x has a capacity r(xi ). Since sensor networks are resource constrained,
we chose to use the energy as a representative for the constraint. A function that maps the
available resource to the constraint is required.
In each iteration, the greedy algorithm makes two choices. First, it chooses a node
v from the set V − V 0 and adds it to V 0 . Second, given the updated set V 0 it chooses
which vertices this set will cover. In fact, v is chosen as the node x ∈ V − V 0 such
that the maximum number of nodes covered (subject to constraints and over all possible
assignments of nodes to dominators) by V 0 ∪ {x} is maximized. Thus, in each iteration,
we first compute the maximum coverage of V 0 ∪ {x} (denoted Nx ), for each x ∈ V − V 0 ,
and then add to V 0 the node v such that Nv is maximum.
The maximum coverage Nx for each vertex x ∈ V − V 0 is calculated using the maxflow algorithm. Let S = V 0 ∪ {x} and let T = V − S. Define a directed graph G0 as
follows: An artificial source s is connected in turn to each vertex y ∈ S with a capacity
equal to r(y), the constraint of y. Next, each vertex y ∈ S is connected to its neighbors in
T with a capacity of one and each node in T is connected to an artificial sink t, also with
capacity one. We compute the max-flow from s to t in G0 . Since the incoming capacity
to each node y ∈ S is equal to the constraint, no node y ∈ S will be able to provide flow
to more nodes than its constraint. Since all the capacities are integral, we can efficiently
find a max-flow that has integral flow on all edges [22]. Because the capacity of each edge
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coming into T is one and the outgoing capacity of the edge from any node in T to t is one,
it follows that each node z ∈ T will satisfy exactly one of the following: (A) z has exactly
one incoming edge with flow = 1 (and the rest with 0 flows) or (B) all edges incoming to
z have 0 flow. We will say that a node z ∈ T is covered if it is of type (A) and we will say
that y is covered by the (unique) node w such that the flow on (w, z) is 1. Let C be this
partial assignment (partial clustering) of nodes in T to nodes in S.
Claim 4.1: Assignment C obeys all constraints r(). Further, the number of nodes in
T that are covered in assignment C is is the maximum number of nodes that can be covered
(subject to constraints r()) by nodes in S.
Proof: The capacity from s to a node w ∈ S is equal to the constraint r(w), and the
flows are integral, w dominates at most r(w) nodes in T . Thus, the constraints are obeyed.
Let k be the number of T nodes that are covered in the assignment C. By our
construction, k is the max flow of G0 . To prove that C is an optimal assignment, consider
an assignment C 0 of T nodes to S nodes such that the number of nodes covered (subject to
constraints r()) is greater than k. Since this assignment can be converted into a valid flow
by giving a flow of 1 to each edge (w, v) such that w ∈ S and v ∈ T and w dominated
v (equivalently, v is assigned to w) in C 0 . The flow achieved is greater than k, which
contradicts the assumption that the max flow in G0 is k.
In each iteration, the algorithm tests each x ∈ V − V 0 , and includes the node that has
the largest max-flow. Note that the partial clustering is recomputed at every stage. Thus, a
node a that is assigned to clusterhead c at stage i might not be assigned to c at step i + 1.
In fact, a might not even be covered at step i + 1.
Theorem 4.2: There is a O(log n) approximation algorithm for ECDS.
Proof: The proof is a simple modification of the standard set cover proof. Let G be the
input graph and r(v) be the constraint on node v. Let X be an optimal energy-constrained
dominating set of size OP T . Note that there is an assignment (clustering) C of nodes in
V − X to nodes in X such that all constraints are obeyed. Let Y be the output of our
algorithm.
Order the nodes in V by the step in which they are covered. (For nodes that are
covered in the same step, order them arbitrarily.) Consider the jth node. At the beginning
of the step k in which j was covered, there were at least n − j uncovered nodes. Let
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Algorithm 1 Constraint Minimum Dominating Set Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vn }, constraint t(vi ) on vertices
Ensure: V 0 ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Connect V to sink with capacity = 1
2: V 0 = ∅
3: Covered = ∅
4: while Covered 6= V − V 0 do
5:
for each vertex x ∈ V − V 0 do
6:
Connect xi to source with capacity = t(xi )
7:
Connect xi to each y ∈ N (xi ) with capacity 1
8:
Connect y ∈ N (xi ) to the terminal with capacity 1
9:
Calculate Nxi = maximum coverage of V 0 ∪ {xi }
10:
end for
11:
Pick xi such that Nxi is maximum
12:
V 0 = V 0 ∪ xi
13:
Update Covered with y ∈ V such that there was flow from x to sink
14: end while
15: Output V 0

the partial dominating set at the beginning of step k be S. Then S ∪ X will cover all
the nodes since X by itself covers all the nodes. Let x be the node selected at step k.
Then, node x covers at least cx =

n−j
OP T

nodes. Associate a weight of 1/cx with each node

that x covers. Then, the total weight associated with all nodes that x covers is at least
1. Also, the jth node gets a weight of at most

OP T
.
n−j

There is an upper bound of the size

of Y in our algorithm, achieved by adding the weights of all nodes. This upper bound is
Pn−1 OP T
1
1
1
j=0 n−j = OP T [ n + n−1 + . . . + 1 ]. Thus, the size of Y is O(log n) ∗ OP T .
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
This algorithm is a modification of the local randomized greedy (LRG) algorithm
from [18]. The LRG algorithm is a modification of the distributed version of the greedy
algorithm of [23]. To enable comparison, we first informally describe the LRG algorithm
and then describe our modification to the algorithm.
The LRG algorithm proceeds in rounds. At the start of a round, each node that is
not already in the dominating set decides whether it wants to be a candidate dominator in
that round. Candidacy is determined by letting only nodes that can cover a large number of
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nodes be candidates. These nodes must have a large number of neighbors remaining. Note
that a node can be covered by multiple candidates. A node defines its support as the number
of candidates that cover it. Each node is selected for the dominating set with a probability
that is the inverse of the median of supports of all nodes that it covers. Once a node is
selected, its neighbors are considered “covered”. The round has ended; if uncovered nodes
remain, another round starts.
The reason for using the median of supports follows: If we pick all the candidates,
then we might pick too many nodes for the dominating set. If we pick only one candidate,
then we may require too many rounds.
We will now describe our modification of the LRG algorithm and show an effective
(O(log n log ∆)) randomized distributed algorithm for ECDS. In this version, the algorithm
is required to obey the constraints in expectation. In particular, for each node u, E[# nodes
covered by u | u is selected as a cluster head] ≤ r(u). In fact, our algorithm obeys the
constraint in expectation in an even stricter sense. Note that in the above formulation, it
is possible for certain sets of cluster heads to grossly violate the constraints. For example,
the above constraint allows an algorithm to have the following behavior: Whenever the
algorithm outputs the set {v1 } as the cluster head, all the constraints are violated grossly.
Our algorithm does not have this undesirable behavior. In fact, our algorithm obeys the
following: Let u be an arbitrary node and let U ⊆ V − {u}. Then, E[# nodes covered by
S
u|U {u} is selected as a cluster head] ≤ r(u). This basically says that the nodes obey the
constraints in expectation independent of one another.
The following issues must be handled:
1. What is the support of a node?
2. Given that we select a node x to be a dominator, how do we select which nodes to
cover/dominate from among the neighbors of x?
To address issue 1, we say that the constrained span c(x) of a node x at a given step
in our algorithm is the smaller of the following two quantities: the number of uncovered
neighbors of x and the constraint of x. (The set of neighbors of a node x includes x
and all nodes with which x shares a high quality communication link/edge). Let x be a
candidate and let y be a node that is adjacent to x. The out-support sout (x) of x is the
ratio of the constrained span c(x) to the number of uncovered neighbors of x. For example,
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if a candidate x has 5 uncovered neighbors and the constraint of x is 3, then c(x) = 3,
sout (x) = 3/5. The out-support of x is the fractional support a node gives to each of its
neighbors. The in-support sin (y) of y is the sum of the out-supports of each neighbor of
y. Thus, the in-support of a node is the total support a node will get if all its neighbors are
dominators and each gives fractional support to all the neighbors. Roughly speaking, the
larger a node’s in-support, the larger the probability that it will be covered in a randomly
chosen dominating set.
How should we decide which nodes to select as dominators? Certainly, selecting
all nodes would be overkill. Consider a node x whose neighbors y1 , y2 , . . ., yk have insupports (in increasing order) sin (1) ≤ sin (2) ≤ . . . ≤ sin (k). Clearly, yk needs node x
as a dominator at most as much as yk−1 needs x because sin (k − 1) ≤ sin (k). Similarly,
yk−1 needs x at most as much as yk−2 needs x, and so on. Thus, to decide whether we
want to select x as a dominator (as in issu 2 above), we use the inverse of the median of
sin (i)’s. More specifically, we select a candidate x with probability equal to the inverse of
the median of the in-supports of the neighbors of x.
The complete algorithm—the weighted local randomized greedy (WLRG) algorithm—
is described in Algorithm 2.
Explanatory notes on the algorithm: Let D = C = ∅. D will denote the set of nodes
selected to be in the dominating set. C will denote the set of nodes already covered by the
dominators. Also, the set of neighbors of x with which x shares a good communication
link are determined using the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). RSSI is inversely
proportional to the signal strength. This allows nodes to communicate only with other
nodes to which there is a strong connection. Fewer retransmissions will be required to
achieve a successful transmission over such links. While there is only a weak correlation
between RSSI and node distance, the link quality does impact the amount of energy
required for communications.
• An intuitive way to think about sin (y) is the following: Suppose all candidate
nodes were made dominators. Suppose also that each dominator x selected c(x)
neighbors—the maximum number of nodes that x can dominate—at random from
its neighbors. Then, sin (x) is the expected number of dominators that cover the
uncovered node x.
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Algorithm 2 Weighted Local Randomized Greedy Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), constraint r(vi ) on vertices
Ensure: Subset D ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Span calculation: Compute the constrained span c(x) by computing the minimum of
the constraint and the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
2: Candidate selection: Compute whether ĉ(x) is at least as much as the constrained
span of each node within a distance of 2 from x. If so, x is a candidate.
3: Constrained out-support calculation: If x is a candidate, compute the constrained
out-support of x as follows: If c(x) = 0, let sout (x) = 0. Else,
sout (x) =

c(x)
.
||N (x) − C||

Note that ||N (x) − C|| is the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
4: Constrained in-support calculation: If x is an uncovered node, let A(x) be the set of
neighbors of x that are candidates. Compute the constrained in-support sin (x) of x as
X
sin (x) =
sout (y).
y∈A(x)

Dominator selection: If x is a candidate, find the median m of {sin (y)|y ∈ N (x)−C}.
Let p = 1/m. With probability p, add x to D.
6: Neighbor selection: If x is selected, add x to D, and for each neighbor y ∈ N (x) − C,
S
select y with probability sout (x) and add it to Vx . Set C = x∈D Vx .
7: Go to the next round.

5:

• A candidate whose uncovered neighbors all have large sin ’s intuitively need not be
selected as a dominator, because its neighbors will likely get covered by other nodes.
On the other hand, if we only select very few dominators, then the algorithm will
run for many rounds. This is the principle for selecting a dominator with probability
equal to the median of the inverse of sin ’s.
We can show the algorithm described above (with a slight modification) returns a
dominating set that obeys the constraints with high probability (whp). The number of
rounds is O(log n log ∆) (∆ is the maximum constrained degree) whp.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM WLRG
WLRG (Weighted Local Randomized Greedy) is described in Section V. We now
show that WLRG terminates in O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability.
Theorem 6.1: WLRG on a graph G = (V, E) terminates in O(log n log ∆) where n
is the number of nodes and ∆ is max{min(t(v), d(v))|v ∈ V }, where t(v) is the constraint
on v and d(v) is the degree of v.
We will now give the proof of this result. The structure of this proof closely follows
the analysis of LRG [18]. In fact, since ECDS is a generalization of the dominating set
problem, WLRG is a generalization of LRG. The key difference between our analysis and
the analysis of LRG is that (a) we need a notion of partial coverage and (b) we need to
incorporate in our analysis the neighbor selection step, a step that is not present in the LRG
algorithm.
Let G = (V, E) be the sensor node graph. In the proof, we will focus on a round
(say the ith round) of WLRG. Let C be the set of nodes covered in an earlier round. Let
H = (V 0 , E 0 ) be the subgraph of G such that V 0 is the union of all candidate nodes X
(as defined by the candidate selection step) and all uncovered nodes Y adjacent to some
x ∈ X, and E 0 consists of edges (u, v) ∈ E where u is a candidate and v is an uncovered
node.
Lemma 6.2: (Equivalent to Lemma 3.1 of [18].) All candidates in a connected
component of H must have the same constrained span.
Proof: Let v1 and v2 be two candidates in a connected component of H. Consider a
path p from v1 to v2 in H. Then there cannot be two consecutive nodes in p such that both
are non-candidates. (This is because at least one end-point of each edge in H is a candidate
node.) Since any two candidates within a distance of 2 must have the same constrained
span, we have that all candidates that lie on p must have the same constrained span. And it
follows that all candidates in a connected component of H have the same constrained span.
We will now show using a potential function argument that WLRG terminates in
O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability. We define the potential at the start of a round
as follows: Let m be the maximum constrained span of any node at the start of a round.
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Define Φ as
Φ=

X

c(v).

v:ĉ(v)=m

Lemma 6.3: (Equivalent to Lemma 3.2 of [18].) Let Φi and Φ0i be the potentials at
the beginning and end of round i. There is a d > 0 such that E[Φ0i ] ≤ dΦi .
Note that the potential at the start of round i+1 might not be the same as the potential
at the end of round i because the underlying graph changes due to some nodes being
covered in round i.
Proof: Recall that X is the set of candidates. For each candidate v, let U (v) denote the
set of uncovered neighbors of v. Sort the elements of U (v) in nonincreasing order of their
in-supports sin ()’s. Let T (v) (respectively, B(v)) denote the set of the first d||U (v)||/2e
(last d||U (v)||/2e) elements of U (v). For a candidate v and a node u ∈ U (v), we say that v
is a top dominator for u if u ∈ T (v). The probability that a top dominator v of u is selected
is 1/m, where m is the median of {sin (y)|y ∈ U (v)}. Since u ∈ T (v), 1/m ≥ 1/sin (u).
For an uncovered node u in H, we say that u is a top heavy node if at least sin (u)/4
of its in-support comes from candidates that are top dominators for u. An uncovered node
is bottom heavy if it is not top heavy.
Lemma 6.4: If u is top heavy, then the probability that u is covered in this round by
a top dominator of u is at least 1 − e−1/4 .
Proof: Let Pc (u) be the probability that u is covered in this round by a top dominator.
Then, the probability that u is not covered in this round by a top dominator is 1 − Pc (u).
Since u is not covered if none of the top dominators adjacent to u cover u, we can write
this probability as:
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) P [u is not covered by v].
We will determine an upper bound this term.
Let Pd (v) be the probability that v is picked to be a dominator in this round. If u is
not covered by v, then exactly one of the following events happen:
• v is not picked to be a dominator (with probability 1 − Pd (v)); or
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• v is picked to be a dominator (with probability Pd (v)) and yet v does not cover u
(with probability 1 − sout (v)).
Thus,
P [u is not covered by v] = (1 − Pd (v)) + Pd (v)(1 − sout (v)),
which simplifies to 1−Pd (v)sout (v). As shown above, if u ∈ T (v), then Pd (v) ≥ 1/sin (u).
Thus,
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 − Pd (v)sout (v)) ≤ Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 −
Define xv =

sout (v)
).
sin (u)

sout (v)
.
sin (u)

Note that since u is top heavy, it follows from definition, that
Σv∈X:u∈T (v) sout (v) ≥

sin (u)
.
4

Thus,
1
Σv∈X:u∈T (v) xv ≥ .
4
Let there be n elements in the set {v ∈ X|u ∈ T (v)}.
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 − xv ) ≤ (1 −

1 n
) ≤ e1/4 .
4n

Since 1 − Pc (u) ≤ e1/4 , it follows that Pc (u) ≥ 1 − e1/4 .
Consider an arbitrary edge (v, u) ∈ E 0 . (Recall that E 0 is the set of edges (v, u) in H
such that v is a candidate and u is an uncovered node.) This edge can be one of four types:
1. v is a top dominator for u and u is top heavy (call this set of edges Ett ),
2. v is a top dominator for u and u is bottom heavy (call this set of edges Etb ),
3. v is a bottom dominator for u and u is top heavy (call this set of edges Ebt ), or
4. v is a bottom dominator for u and u is bottom heavy (call this set of edges Ebb ).
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Let Stt =

P

(v,u)∈Ett

sout (v). Similarly, define Stb , Sbt , and Sbb . Let S be the sum over all

edges (v, u) such that v is a candidate and u is an uncovered node in H, of sout (v).
Note that Ett ∩ Ebt or Ebt ∩ Ebb might not be empty because a node v can be both a
top and a bottom dominator for a node u. Certainly, though, Ett ∩ Etb = Ebt ∩ Ebb = ∅.
Lemma 6.5: (equivalent to Lemma 3.4 of [18].) Let Stt and S be as defined above.
Then,
Stt ≥ (1/3)S.
Proof: Consider a bottom heavy node u.
X

sout (v) <

sin (u)
.
4

sout (v) ≥

3sin (u)
.
4

v∈X:u∈B(v)

Thus,
X
v∈X:u∈B(v)

Thus,
X

sout (v) > 3

v∈X:u∈B(v)

X

sout (v).

v∈X:u∈T (v)

If we sum both sides of the above inequality over all bottom heavy nodes, we have that
Sbb ≥ 3Stb . We also know that Sbb ≤ (1/2)S. Thus, Stb ≤ (1/6)S. Now,
Stt + Stb ≥ (1/2)S.
Thus, Stt ≥ (1/2 − 1/6)S = (1/3)S.
We can now use these results to prove Lemma 6.3 and also Theorem 6.1 in exactly
the same manner as [18]. The only difference between the two proofs is that in our proof
∆ is max{min(t(v), d(v))|v ∈ V }, a global upper bound on the constrained span for any
node in any round, while in [18] ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph, also a global upper
bound on the span of a node in the graph.
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VII. EXPERIMENTS
In order to test the distributed clustering algorithm, we implemented the algorithm
in TinyOS and ran simulations in TOSSIM [24]. We compared the ECDS algorithm
against the HEED algorithm [7] and used a random topology for each simulation. We
ran a simulated 15 minutes for network sizes of 30, 45, 60, and 75 nodes. Our algorithm
is independent of the routing protocol used, but for our experiments we use the Surge
multi-hop application that is part of TinyOS. HEED also uses the Surge multi-hop routing
protocol. Each node generates a reading every 20 seconds. The cluster heads aggregate the
readings. Surge uses a link estimation and parent selection (LEPS) mechanism to determine
multi-hop routes. All traffic received at each node is monitored and used to update the
internal neighbor table. The neighbor table tracks all neighbors and selects the next hop
based on shortest path semantics. The default destination is the base station. We use a
credit-point system for updating the mote energy budget as used with iHEED [25]. ECDS
and HEED use energy for tasks such as sending and receiving and points are deducted
propotional to the actual amount of energy used. Each node starts with the same amount
of points and for each send/receive an amount proportional to the size of the message is
deducted. In our implementation, a cluster head receives many more messages from nodes
in its cluster than it sends. All messages are sent with the same power level, therefore
we do not consider the distance when determining the cost of each send/receive [26]. For
ECDS, the initial energy allows a constraint of 20. Whenever the network re-clusters, the
constraint is updated and is based on the energy available at each node. For each network
size, the experiments were repeated 30 times. We measured the size of the dominating set
and compared it to the expected size of the dominating set for each round, which allowed
us to show that the algorithm performs as expected. We measured the number of rounds
the algorithm executed until the entire network was clustered. We compared the time of
the first node’s death to the last node’s death. Having all nodes die at approximately the
same time provides the most useful WSN. Additionally, we measured the time it took for
the entire network to cluster. A fast clustering algorithm ensures a useful WSN.
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A. Cluster Generation
In a distributed environment it is important to evaluate how long it takes for a
clustering protocol to finish. There are two measurements for WSN: time and the number of
rounds of execution. Figure 2(a) shows the average number of rounds to cluster the network
for various sizes. An ideal distributed clustering algorithm will cluster in a constant number
of rounds. Both the ECDS and the HEED algorithm execute in a constant number of
rounds, but the ECDS algorithm finished in fewer rounds. The algorithm depends on
the routing information obtained from the (independent) routing protocol. This routing
information may not be complete, especially in the earlier rounds. Incomplete routing
information will exclude some nodes from joining a cluster at each round. Similar behavior
can be seen in Figure 2(b), which shows the average time it took for the networks to
cluster. Clearly, the number of rounds and the time are related and both are important
measurements. An algorithm that runs over several short rounds may still outperform an
algorithm that runs in a constant number of long rounds. Again, it is important that an
algorithm takes a constant amount of time, no matter the size of the network. Both the
ECDS and the HEED algorithm take a constant amount of time, but the ECDS algorithm is
faster.
B. Cluster Goodness
Our algorithm uses a randomized, probabilistic approach. At each round, the sum of
the probabilities is equal to the number of expected cluster heads. Figure 2(c) shows the
average expected number of cluster heads versus the average actual number of cluster heads
for each network size. For all networks, the average number of expected cluster heads is
close to the average actual number of cluster heads, indicating that our algorithm performs
as expected. Figure 3(a) shows the average size of the dominating set. The dominating set
is the number of cluster heads selected for each simulation run. Each node starts with the
same amount of energy, an amount that can support up to 20 nodes in a cluster. Another
important consideration is the number of nodes assigned to each cluster. Scalability is
improved when clusters are of similar size regardless of network size. Figure 3(b) shows
the average number of nodes in each cluster. In ECDS the number of nodes assigned to
a cluster remains relatively constant, while the size decreases asymptotically for HEED.
Not only the number of nodes in each cluster and the number of clusters matter, but also
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how many of those clusters are single-node clusters (clusters in which the cluster head is
the only node). A single node cluster does not improve performance, but it is generally
unavoidable. A good algorithm will minimize the number of such clusters. Figure 3(c)
shows the average number of single node clusters for ECDS and HEED. For ECDS the
number of single node clusters decreases as the size of the network grows. ECDS choses
only neighbors which are “near” as cluster heads, some nodes will not be near a cluster
head and thus create single node clusters. As the network grows, each node has more
opportunities to find a near cluster head, hence the decrease. On the other hand, HEED’s
single node clusters increase in number as the network grows.
C. Lifetime of Sensor Nodes
In a wireless sensor network, the early death of some nodes can disconnect other
nodes from the base station. This situation can lead to a reduced usefulness of the network
because some data cannot reach the base station. We measure lifetime in two ways: (1)
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the time at which the first node dies and (2) the time at which the last node dies. The time
at which the first node dies is important because it can lead to a disconnection of part of
the network. The time at which the last node dies shows how long nodes are able to run
the protocol. Figure 4(a) shows the time at which the first node died for the ECDS and
the HEED algorithm. The time of the first death asymptotically decreases in ECDS and is
constant for HEED. Figure 4(b) shows the time of death for the last node in the network.
It is equally important that all nodes die around the same time. A single node that outlives
others by a large margin is of little use. It can be estimated that the lifetimes will be similar
for ECDS and HEED in large networks. For both ECDS and HEED the first and last deaths
are within 200 seconds of each other, indicating an even energy consumption across the
network.
D. Energy Consumption
The amount of energy used during the execution of a protocol is very important in
sensor networks. Figure 4(c) shows the average energy consumption for the two protocols.
The energy consumption of the HEED algorithm is linear, while the energy consumption
of the ECDS algorithm is asymptotically decreasing. As the networks grow larger, the
energy consumption for ECDS and HEED will be similar. In sensor networks, the energy
consumption for each message sent should be considered in addition to the overall energy
consumption. A sensor network that uses very little energy is not useful if it does not
produce an adequate amount of data. Figure 4(d) shows the average energy consumption
for each message sent. Since ECDS clusters faster, it generates more messages.
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, two different algorithms are presented to address the problem of energy
constrained clustering for wireless sensor networks. For the greedy algorithm we provide
an O(log n) approximation guarantee. The second algorithm presented is a distributed
algorithm for the energy constrained dominating set. We proved that this algorithm runs
in O(log n log ∆) rounds whp. This algorithm performs well on the random graphs in our
simulations. Our simulations showed that our algorithm performs very well in terms of
time to cluster, cluster size, and energy consumption. We compared our algorithm with
the HEED algorithm. It outperformed HEED in terms of cluster size, time to cluster, and
energy consumption per message sent. Future work will include extending the algorithm to
consider node proximity when selecting cluster heads and deciding which nodes to add
to the cluster. Considering node proximity will produce tighter clusters and minimize
the overall energy consumption within each cluster. Secondly, we plan on extending the
algorithm to allow for multi-hop clusters. Currently every node is one hop from its cluster
head. We will extend the algorithm to allow nodes to be k-hops from their cluster heads.
Additionally, we plan on extending the algorithm to allow each node to have multiple
cluster heads which will ensure that each node has access to at least one cluster head at
all times. Ensuring multiple coverings for each node will allow for the use of multi-path
routing in clustered networks.
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II. ENERGY CONSTRAINED CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS FOR WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS

Julia Albath, Student Member, IEEE, Mayur Thakur, Member, IEEE, and Sanjay
Madria, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract— Using partitioning in sensor networks to create clusters for routing,
data management, and other protocols has been proven as a way to ensure scalability
and to deal with sensor network shortcomings such as limited communication ranges and
energy. Choosing a cluster head within each cluster is important because cluster heads
use additional energy for their responsibilities and that burden needs to be carefully passed
around. Many existing protocols either choose cluster heads randomly or use nodes with the
highest remaining energy. We introduce the energy constrained minimum dominating set
(ECDS) to model the problem of optimally choosing cluster heads with energy constraints.
We show its applicability to sensor networks and give an approximation algorithm for
solving the ECDS problem. We propose a distributed algorithm for the constrained
dominating set. We experimentally show that the distributed algorithm performs well in
terms of energy usage, node lifetime, and clustering time and, thus, is very suitable for
wireless sensor networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
As sensor networks mature and are used in many situations, the necessity arises for new and
improved protocol and algorithms. Each sensor has a limited amount of energy available.
Combined with other limited resources such as processing power, radio bandwidth and
memory, new protocols and algorithms need to be developed. Routing protocols need to
work within this limited environment while achieving their goals.
The limited resources are important and need to be considered because they affect the
lifetime of the network. In most applications of wireless sensor networks, it is impossible to
replace batteries in order to extend the lifetime of the network. Adding additional sensors
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may be a possibility in some situations, but not in cases such as battlefield deployment.
This illustrates the need for protocols which extend the lifetime of the network and hence
extend the usefulness of the network.
Routing protocols and algorithms which organize the network into clusters have been
shown to greatly improve network lifetime [1]. Clustering has been shown to greatly reduce
power consumption, is easily scalable, and is robust in face of node failures [2]. A good
clustering scheme takes into account one or more of the following: communication range,
number and type of sensors, geographical location, and remaining energy [3]. Clustering
protocols need to make two important decisions, one is cluster head selection and the other
is which nodes to assign to which cluster head.
Cluster head selection is important because cluster heads spend more energy
aggregating, forwarding messages, doing general routing maintenance and similar actions.
A small set of cluster heads may not be optimal in terms of network lifetime. A cluster head
uses additional energy and could be depleted much sooner then other nodes. More cluster
heads may mean that each cluster head has less work to do and each cluster head may
survive a longer amount of time. Consider the graph shown in Figure 1. Each node starts
with the same amount of energy (7 units) (Figure 1(a)) and one unit is used for each receive
or send. The cluster head aggregates the received messages into one outgoing message. The
optimal dominating set is one node (Figure 1(b)), but the network becomes disconnected
after only one time step. On the other hand a slightly non-optimal dominating set using
the heuristic “Don’t give a cluster head more than three nodes” results in a network that
survives two time steps as shown in Figures 1(c) and 1(d) (the shaded nodes represent the
cluster heads).
Cluster head selection in wireless sensor networks and in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(MANET) benefits from using a dominating set approach. Dominating set clustering can
be executed in a constant number of rounds which leads to better clustering [4]. In a
dominating set approach each node is either a cluster head or one hop from a cluster
head [5]. This can be extended to allow each node to be at most k-hops from its cluster head.
Allowing for k-hops within a cluster improves scalability in very large networks. Very
large networks, even when clustered will exhibit problems similar to unclustered, smaller
networks [6]. The Energy Constrained Dominating Set (ECDS) was introduced. Each
node in a wireless sensor network is constrained by its limited resources, especially energy.
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Fig. 1. Energy Constrained Clustering Example

Other constraints include, but are not limited to, bandwidth, storage and computational
abilities. ECDS models the problem of optimally choosing cluster heads with energy
constraints. The distributed ECDS algorithm runs in O(log n log ∆) rounds whp (with
high probability). Experimental evaluations showed the distributed algorithm to be very
well suited for wireless sensor networks. Motivated by the above examples, we improve
the Weighted Local Randomized Greedy Algorithm. The contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• We introduce an improved ECDS (iECDS) algorithm. iECDS improves the performance of ECDS by considering the connection quality to neighbors when making
decisions. This reduces the power required to successfully send messages and it
extends the lifetime of the network. We improved ECDS by modifying the candidate
selection. In iECDS candidate selection is based on the rounded constrained span
unlike ECDS which uses the constrained span. The rounded constrained span is the
smallest power of 2 that is at least as much as the constrained span. This increases
the number of candidates elected at each round and leads to faster network clustering.
The iECDS algorithm is described in Section 4.2.
• We introduce a k-hop cluster ECDS (kECDS) algorithm. In kECDS a node can be
up to k hops from its cluster head. kECDS, like iECDS and ECDS, uses multi-hop
from the cluster heads to the base station. Allowing for k-hops within a cluster leads
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to larger clusters and fewer small clusters. Section 4.3 provides the details of the
kECDS algorithm.
• We provide extensive simulations using TOSSIM in Section 6. We compared the
performance of the iECDS and kECDS algorithms to ECDS and HEED[7]. HEED
selects cluster heads according to residual energy and node proximity to neighbors or
node degree. ECDS uses local information about the connectivity of each node and
the connectivity of its neighbors in addition to the residual energy to decide which
node should become a cluster head.

2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we make assumptions regarding the environment in which the network will
operate. The network consists of a number of nodes randomly placed in the area to be
monitored. Each sensor has the same abilities and the network includes one base station,
such as a laptop, which has additional processing powers. Other assumptions are detailed
here.
• The sensor nodes are stationary, that is, nodes cannot move from one location
to another on their own accord. Nodes can be moved by external forces, such
as animals, attackers or strong winds. Any node movement will be taken into
account whenever the network reclusters. After moving, a node may no longer be
in communication range of its cluster head. From the time when a node moves until
the network is reclustered, the node will not be able to contribute data. When the
network is reclustered, the node choses a new cluster head and contributes data.
• Communication links are symmetric. If node u can hear node v, then node v can hear
node u. The algorithms use the local neighborhood connectivity and layout in order
to elect cluster heads, so it is important that all nodes in the neighborhood are aware
of the connections. A node needs to know that its neighbors can hear it. If node u is
a candidate cluster head and knows node v is in its neighborhood, it is important that
v can hear u.
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• Nodes are not location aware. The nodes are not equipped with GPS receivers
and do not know their location within the covered area. Nodes do not know in
which direction other nodes are located, nor do they know what other nodes can
communicate with each other. Nodes do not know the physical distance to the base
station. Nodes do know how many hops they are from the base station.
• Each sensor knows its local neighborhood. Nodes communicate with each other
using wireless communication to construct a connected network. Each node knows
which nodes it is able to communicate with and it knows the quality of this
connection. Messages are exchanged using some underlying multi-hop routing
protocol. The algorithms are independent of the routing protocol used.
• The nodes and the network will be left unattended after deployment. Some messages
may be sent from the base station to the network. These messages will not contain
global network information. Algorithms need to be able to take the local information
and make global decisions.
• Some nodes are able to communicate with the base station, but the majority are not in
direct communication range of the base station. Those nodes will use the underlying
multi-hop routing protocol to send their messages to the base station. The ECDS
algorithms are independent of the routing protocol. Any multi-hop routing protocol
can be used with the ECDS algorithms.
• The nodes are loosely time-synchronized. Time-synchronization is necessary in
order to make sure that all nodes participate in the ECDS algorithms within the
same interval. This time-synchronization can be handled by existing hardware on
most nodes. The ECDS algorithms do not require special time-synchronization
algorithms.

3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In a typical wireless sensor network, n nodes are distributed randomly over the coverage
area. Our goal is to ensure that the area is properly covered to ensure even sensing. In this
work, coverage also refers to one node’s ability to handle the relaying of messages to and
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from other nodes in its cluster. We want to organize the network into clusters such that each
cluster has one cluster head. All other nodes send their messages to the cluster head. The
cluster head will aggregate the data received from the cluster and send the aggregate to the
base station.
A sensor network can be expressed as a graph G = (V, E), where each of the vertices
represents a sensor node and there is an edge between two vertices if their corresponding
sensor nodes are within each other’s communication range. A dominating set of a graph
G = (V, E) is a subset V 0 ⊆ V such that each x ∈ V − V 0 has a neighbor in V 0 . The
assignment of nodes to cluster heads is often modeled as a dominating set (DS) problem [8].
The minimum dominating set problem is NP-complete for general graphs[9] and remains
NP-complete for planar graphs, unit disk graphs, bi-partite graphs, and chordal graphs, but
it does admit a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for planar graphs and
unit disk graphs [10], [11]. The dominating set problem models the optimization problem
of finding a small number of cluster heads.
We will now describe the notations using in the rest of the paper and define
dominating set and energy constrained dominating set.
Definition 3.1: The dominating set for a graph G and a subset S of the vertex set
V (G), denote by NG [S] the set of vertices in G which are in S or adjacent to a vertex in S.
If NG [S] = V (G), then S is said to be a dominating set of G.
Definition 3.2: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E), and, for each vi ∈ V (G), a
constraint r(vi ) ∈ N , the energy-constrained dominating set (ECDS) of G is a pair (S, C),
where C is an assignment from x ∈ S to Vx ⊆ V such that (a) Vx |x ∈ S is a partition of V ,
(b) for each x ∈ S, x ∈ Vx ⊆ NG [x], G so that the following condition is met, and (c) for
each x ∈ S, ||Vx || ≤ r(x) + 1.
In the definition of ECDS we assume that when a node is selected as cluster head, it
includes itself in the cluster. (See part (b) of the definition). Also note from the “+1” in
condition (c) that we allow a node to cover itself for free. That is, the constraint r(x) for x
denotes the maximum number of nodes that x can cover in addition to itself.
ECDS is also related to, but different from, the Network Clustering problem [12].
ECDS has a constraint parameter that is not present in Network Clustering. Also, the
clusters must form a partition in ECDS, whereas they may overlap in the Network
Clustering problem.

The general dominating set can be described as a constrained

43

dominating set where each constraint is equal to n, the number of nodes in the graph.
It trivially follows, that the constrained minimum dominating set is NP-complete. The
minimum dominating set in the general form has approximation algorithms of 1+log ||V ||.
Since the constrained dominating set problem is a special case of the general dominating
set problem, no improvement on these bounds will be possible.
4 ENERGY CONSTRAINED CLUSTERING PROTOCOLS
First we present the original ECDS protocol followed by the improved ECDS (iECDS)
and kECDS, which is a version of ECDS that allows for k-hop communication within the
cluster.
4.1. Energy Constrained Dominating Set
In this section we describe the ECDS protocol. First, we give the algorithm and discuss
the parameters used in the clustering process. Second, we will show the theoretical
performance bounds of the ECDS algorithms. This enables us to compare the iECDS and
kECDS algorithms to the original ECDS algorithm.
4.1.1. ECDS Algorithm
We will explain and define several terms used in order to facilitate the understanding of
the algorithm. The constrained span c(x) of a node x in the ECDS algorithm is defined
as the smaller of: the number of uncovered neighbors of x and the constraint of x. The
neighbors of x are defined as x and all nodes with which x shares a communication
link of high quality. We use the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) to determine
link quality. RSSI is inversely proportional to the signal strength. This allows us to
communicate only with nodes to which we have a strong connection and therefore require
fewer retransmissions to achieve our goal. This improves the cluster’s ability to achieve
its goal. While there is a weak correlation between RSSI and node distance, the link
quality does impact the amount of power required for communications. Adjusting a nodes’
neighborhood based on link quality allows us to use the lowest possible power setting for
transmissions in order to communicate with the nodes in the cluster. This leads to additional
energy savings. Let x be a candidate cluster head and y be a neighbor of x. Then the out-
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support sout (x) of x is the ratio of the constrained span c(x) to the number of uncovered
neighbors of x. Assume that node x is a candidate and has 6 neighbors therefore c(x) = 4
and sout (x) = 4/6. In other words, the out-support of a candidate is the fractional support
a node can offer to each neighbor. The in-support sin (y) of y is the sum of the out-support
of each neighbor of y. Thus, the in-support of a node is the total support a node will get
if all its neighboring dominators gives fractional support to each of its neighbors. The
larger a node’s in-support, the larger the probability that it will be covered by at least one
dominator. We can say that sin (x) is the expected number of dominators that can cover x.
Intuitively, we do not need to make dominators who have uncovered neighbors that all have
large sin ’s. Those neighbors have a high probability of being covered by other nodes. This
is the intuition for selecting a dominator with probability equal to the median of the inverse
of sin ’s.
This raises the question of how should we decide which nodes to select as dominators? On one hand, selecting all nodes would be overkill. On the other hand, if we only
select very few dominators, then the algorithm will run for many rounds. Let node x whose
neighbors y1 , y2 , . . ., yk have in-supports (in increasing order) sin (1) ≤ sin (2) ≤ . . . ≤
sin (k). Clearly, yk needs node x as a dominator at most as much as yk−1 needs x because
sin (k − 1) ≤ sin (k). Similarly, yk−1 needs x at most as much as yk−2 needs x, and so
on. Thus, to decide whether we want to select x as a dominator, we use the inverse of the
median of sin (i)’s.
The completed weighted local randomized greedy (WLRG) algorithm is described
in Algorithm 1. Each node x executes the algorithm in each round until the node and its
neighbors are covered. Initially let D = C = ∅. D will denote the set of nodes selected to
be in the dominating set. C will denote the set of nodes already covered by the dominators.
Additionally, N (x) denotes the set of neighbors of x, this includes x. Also note that by
definition of c(y), c(y) ≤ ||N (y) − C||. Thus, if ||N (y) − C|| = 0, then c(y) = 0, and so
sout (y) = 0.
4.1.2. Complexity Analysis
We now show that WLRG terminates in O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability.
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Algorithm 1 Weighted Local Randomized Greedy Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), constraint r(vi ) on vertices
Ensure: Subset D ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Span calculation: Compute the constrained span c(x) by computing the minimum of
the constraint and the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
2: Candidate selection: Compute whether c(x) is at least as much as the constrained
span of each node within a distance of 2 from x. If so, x is a candidate.
3: Constrained out-support calculation: If x is a candidate, compute the constrained
out-support of x as follows: If c(x) = 0, let sout (x) = 0. Else,
sout (x) =

c(x)
.
||N (x) − C||

Note that ||N (x) − C|| is the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
4: Constrained in-support calculation: If x is an uncovered node, let A(x) be the set of
neighbors of x that are candidates. Compute the constrained in-support sin (x) of x as
X
sin (x) =
sout (y).
y∈A(x)

Dominator selection: If x is a candidate, find the median m of {sin (y) | y ∈ N (x) −
C}. Let p = 1/m. With probability p, add x to D.
6: Neighbor selection: If x is selected, add x to D, and for each neighbor y ∈ N (x) − C,
S
select y with probability sout (x) and add it to Vx . Set C = x∈D Vx .
7: Go to the next round.

5:

Theorem 4.1: WLRG on a graph G = (V, E) terminates in O(log n log ∆) where n
is the number of nodes and ∆ is max{min(t(v), d(v)) | v ∈ V }, where t(v) is the constraint
on v and d(v) is the degree of v.
We will now give the proof of this result. The structure of this proof closely follows
the analysis of LRG [13]. Let G = (V, E) be the sensor node graph. In the proof, we
will focus on a round (say the ith round) of WLRG. Let C be the set of nodes covered in
an earlier round. Let H = (V 0 , E 0 ) be the subgraph of G such that V 0 is the union of all
candidate nodes X (as defined by the candidate selection step) and all uncovered nodes Y
adjacent to some x ∈ X, and E 0 consists of edges (u, v) ∈ E where u is a candidate and v
is an uncovered node.
Lemma 4.2: (Equivalent to Lemma 3.1 of [13].) All candidates in a connected
component of H have the same span.
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Proof: Let v1 and v2 be two candidates in a connected component of H. Consider a
path p from v1 to v2 in H. Then there cannot be two consecutive nodes in p such that both
are non-candidates. (This is because at least one end-point of each edge in H is a candidate
node.) Since any two candidates within a distance of 2 must have the same span, we have
that all candidates that lie on p must have the same span. And it follows that all candidates
in a connected component of H must have the same span.
We will now show using a potential function argument that WLRG terminates in
O(log n log ∆) rounds with high probability. We define the potential at the start of a round
as follows. Let o be the maximum span of any node at the start of a round. Define Φ as
Φ=

X

c(v).

v:c(v)=o

Lemma 4.3: (Equivalent to Lemma 3.2 of [13].) Let Φi and Φ0i be the potentials at
the beginning and end of round i. There is a d > 0 such that E[Φ0i ] ≤ dΦi .
Note that the potential at the start of round i+1 might not be the same as the potential
at the end of round i because the underlying graph changes due to some nodes being
covered in round i.
Proof: Recall that X is the set of candidates. For each candidate v, let U (v) denote the
set of uncovered neighbors of v. Sort the elements of U (v) in non-increasing order of their
in-supports sin ()’s. Let T (v) (respectively, B(v)) denote the set of the first d||U (v)||/2e
(last d||U (v)||/2e) elements of U (v). For a candidate v and a node u ∈ U (v), we say that v
is a top dominator for u if u ∈ T (v). The probability that a top dominator v of u is selected
is 1/m, where m is the median of {sin (y) | y ∈ U (v)}. Since u ∈ T (v), 1/m ≥ 1/sin (u).
For an uncovered node u in H, we say that u is a top heavy node if at least sin (u)/4
of its in-support comes from candidates that are top dominators for u. An uncovered node
is bottom heavy if it is not top heavy.
Lemma 4.4: If u is top heavy, then the probability that u is covered in this round by
a top dominator of u is at least 1 − e−1/4 .
Proof: Let Pc (u) be the probability that u is covered in this round by a top dominator.
Then, the probability that u is not covered in this round by a top dominator is 1 − Pc (u).
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Since u is not covered if none of the top dominators adjacent to u cover u, we can write
this probability as:
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) P [u is not covered by v].
We will determine an upper bound on this item.
Let Pd (v) be the probability that v is picked to be a dominator in this round. If u is
not covered by v, then exactly one of the following events happen:
• v is not picked to be a dominator (with probability 1 − Pd (v) or
• v is picked to be a dominator (with probability Pd (v)) and yet v does not cover u
(with probability 1 − sout (v))
Thus,
P [u is not covered by v] = (1 − Pd (v)) + Pd (v)(1 − sout (v)),
which simplifies to 1−Pd (v)sout (v). As shown above, if u ∈ T (v), then Pd (v) ≥ 1/sin (u).
Thus,
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 − Pd (v)sout (v)) ≤ Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 −
Define xv =

sout (v)
).
sin (u)

sout (v)
.
sin (u)

Note that since u is top heavy, it follows from definition, that
Σv∈X:u∈T (v) sout (v) ≥

sin (u)
.
4

Thus,
1
Σv∈X:u∈T (v) xv ≥ .
4
Let there be n elements in the set {v ∈ X | u ∈ T (v)}.
Πv∈X:u∈T (v) (1 − xv ) ≤ (1 −

1 n
) ≤ e1/4
4n
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Since 1 − Pc (u) ≤ e1/4 , it follows that Pc (u) ≥ 1 − e1/4 .
Consider an arbitrary edge (v, u) ∈ E 0 . (Recall that E 0 is the set of edges (v, u) in H
such that v is a candidate and u is an uncovered node.) This edge can be one of four types:
1. v is a top dominator for u and u is top heavy (call this set of edges Ett ),
2. v is a top dominator for u and u is bottom heavy (call this set of edges Etb ),
3. v is a bottom dominator for u and u is top heavy (call this set of edges Ebt ), or
4. v is a bottom dominator for u and u is bottom heavy (call this set of edges Ebb ).
Let Stt =

P

(v,u)∈Ett

sout (v). Similarly, define Stb , Sbt , and Sbb . Let S be the sum,

over all edges (v, u) such that v is a candidate and u is an uncovered node in H, of sout (v).
Note that Ett ∩ Ebt or Ebt ∩ Ebb might not be empty because a node v can be both a
top and a bottom dominator for a node u. Certainly, though, Ett ∩ Etb = Ebt ∩ Ebb = ∅.
Lemma 4.5: (equivalent to Lemma 3.4 of [13].) Let Stt and S be as defined above.
Then,
Stt ≥ (1/3)S.
Proof: Consider a bottom heavy node u.
X

sout (v) <

sin (u)
.
4

sout (v) ≥

3sin (u)
.
4

v∈X:u∈B(v)

Thus,
X
v∈X:u∈B(v)

Thus,
X
v∈X:u∈B(v)

sout (v) > 3

X
v∈X:u∈T (v)

sout (v).
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If we sum both sides of the above inequality over all bottom heavy nodes, we have that
Sbb ≥ 3Stb . We also know that Sbb ≤ (1/2)S. Thus, Stb ≤ (1/6)S. Now,
Stt + Stb ≥ (1/2)S.
Thus, Stt ≥ (1/2 − 1/6)S = (1/3)S.
We can now use these results to prove Lemma 4.3 and also Theorem 4.1 in exactly
the same manner as [13]. The only difference between the two proofs is that in our proof
∆ is max{min(t(v), d(v)) | v ∈ V }, a global upper bound on the constrained span for any
node in any round, while in [13] ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph, also a global upper
bound on the span of a node in the graph.
4.2. Improved ECDS (iECDS)
We will now describe the iECDS protocol. iECDS improves upon ECDS by using a
rounded constrained span ĉ(x). The rounded constrained span ĉ(x) is the smallest power
of 2 that is at least as much as c(x). Using the rounded span generates larger connected
components and thus will lead to a clustered network in fewer rounds. By using the rounded
constrained span more nodes will become candidates in the early rounds and therefore
more cluster heads will be elected. This means that the entire network is clustered in fewer
rounds.
4.2.1. iECDS Algorithm
We provide the entire iECDS algorithm in Algorithm 2.
4.2.2. Complexity Analysis
The proof for iECDS follows the proof for ECDS almost exactly. The only change that it
requires is for Lemma 4.2, substituting ”rounded span” for ”span”.
Lemma 4.6: All candidates in a connected component of H must have the same
rounded span.
Proof: Let v1 and v2 be two candidates in a connected component of H. Consider a
path p from v1 to v2 in H. Then there cannot be two consecutive nodes in p such that both
are non-candidates. (This is because at least one end-point of each edge in H is a candidate
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Algorithm 2 Improved ECDS Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), constraint r(vi ) on vertices
Ensure: Subset D ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Span calculation: Compute the constrained span c(x) by computing the minimum of
the constraint and the number of uncovered neighbors of x. Also, compute ĉ(x), the
rounded constrained span as the smallest power of 2 that is at least as much as c(x).
2: Candidate selection: Compute whether ĉ(x) is at least as much as the constrained
span of each node within a distance of 2 from x. If so, x is a candidate.
3: Constrained out-support calculation: If x is a candidate, compute the constrained
out-support of x as follows: If c(x) = 0, let sout (x) = 0. Else,
sout (x) =

4:

c(x)
.
||N (x) − C||

Note that ||N (x) − C|| is the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
Constrained in-support calculation: If x is an uncovered node, let A(x) be the set of
neighbors of x that are candidates. Compute the constrained in-support sin (x) of x as
X
sin (x) =
sout (y).
y∈A(x)

Dominator selection: If x is a candidate, find the median m of {sin (y) | y ∈ N (x) −
C}. Let p = 1/m. With probability p, add x to D.
6: Neighbor selection: If x is selected, add x to D, and for each neighbor y ∈ N (x) − C,
S
select y with probability sout (x) and add it to Vx . Set C = x∈D Vx .
7: Go to the next round.

5:

node.) Since any two candidates within a distance of 2 must have the same rounded span,
we have that all candidates that lie on p must have the same rounded span. And it follows
that all candidates in a connected component of H must have the same rounded span.
This change does not improve the theoretical bound, but our simulations show an
improvement in the clustering algorithm, as can be seen in Section 6.
4.3. ECDS for k-hop Clusters (kECDS)
Our next improvement to ECDS allows the creation of clusters where a node can be up
to k-hops from the cluster head. ECDS and iECDS required that each node can reach its
cluster head within one hop. k-hop clusters will improve scalability, especially in very
large networks. In very large networks, single hop clustering requires a large number of
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cluster heads and could lead to the same kind of problems as can be found in unclustered
networks [6]. Cluster heads use additional energy, thus it is desirable to minimize the
number of cluster heads. Allowing k-hops within a cluster will reduce the number of
cluster heads. From the definition of dominating set, each node is either a cluster head
or a neighbor of a cluster head. In k-hop clustering that definition is relaxed. A node is
either a cluster head or at most k-hops from a cluster head. This allows clusters to be more
spread out and requires fewer cluster heads to cover the same number of nodes. It also
reduces the frequency of single node clusters, because a node has more clusters to join.
4.3.1. kECDS Algorithm
For kECDS we change the definition of neighborhood of x. N (x) denotes the set of
neighbors of x within k hops of x and includes x itself. The details for the kECDS algorithm
are given in 3.
4.3.2. Complexity Analysis
The proof for kECDS follows the proof for iECDS almost exactly. The only change that it
requires is for Lemma 4.6, substituting k + 1 for 2.
Lemma 4.7: All candidates in a connected component of H have the same rounded
span.
Proof: Let v1 and v2 be two candidates in a connected component of H. Consider a
path p from v1 to v2 in H. Then there cannot be two consecutive nodes in p such that both
are non-candidates. (This is because at least one end-point of each edge in H is a candidate
node.) Since any two candidates within a distance of k + 1 must have the same rounded
span, we have that all candidates that lie on p must have the same rounded span. And it
follows that all candidates in a connected component of H must have the same rounded
span.
This change does not improve the theoretical bound, but our simulations show an
improvement in the clustering algorithm, as can be seen in Section 6.
4.4. Multi-Path ECDS (mECDS)
Our next improvement to the ECDS algorithm allows the use of multipath routing intra
and inter cluster. Multipath routing is an energy efficient, load-balanced, fault-tolerant and
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Algorithm 3 k-Hop ECDS Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), constraint r(vi ) on vertices
Ensure: Subset D ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Span calculation: Compute the constrained span c(x) by computing the minimum of
the constraint and the number of uncovered neighbors of x. Also, compute ĉ(x), the
rounded constrained span as the smallest power of 2 that is at least as much as c(x).
2: Candidate selection: Compute whether ĉ(x) is at least as much as the constrained
span of each node within a distance of k + 1 from x. If so, x is a candidate.
3: Constrained out-support calculation: If x is a candidate, compute the constrained
out-support of x as follows: If c(x) = 0, let sout (x) = 0. Else,
sout (x) =

4:

c(x)
.
||N (x) − C||

Note that ||N (x) − C|| is the number of uncovered neighbors of x.
Constrained in-support calculation: If x is an uncovered node, let A(x) be the set of
neighbors of x that are candidates. Compute the constrained in-support sin (x) of x as
X
sin (x) =
sout (y).
y∈A(x)

Dominator selection: If x is a candidate, find the median m of {sin (y) | y ∈ N (x) −
C}. Let p = 1/m. With probability p, add x to D.
6: Neighbor selection: If x is selected, add x to D, and for each neighbor y ∈ N (x) − C,
S
select y with probability sout (x) and add it to Vx . Set C = x∈D Vx .
7: Go to the next round.

5:

reliable routing approach [14]. Multipath routing can be applied to routing from cluster
heads to the base station to improve reliability and provide energy efficiency and faulttolerance. Additionally, a multipath approach can also be used from each node to its
cluster head. Using multiple cluster heads ensures that a node has another cluster head
available when one fails even when single path routing is used. However, we have to make
the assumption that the link between a node and its cluster head is no more reliable then
any other link in the network. By using multipath routing, these type of problems can be
mitigated. Most clustering protocols could be extended to work with multipath routing.
Our extension of ECDS will lead to better performance and more energy savings.
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4.4.1. mECDS Algorithm
In mECDS, each node has a coverage requirement. The coverage requirement is an
indicator of the number of cluster heads a node desires. This coverage requirement may
be the same throughout the network or it is decided by each node depending on the link
quality to its neighbors. A cluster head will chose to cover a node with larger coverage
requirements first. This will result in energy efficient clustering, while ensuring that all
nodes have have the maximum coverage possible which will allow for largest energy
savings while using multipath routing. The details can be found in Algorithm 4. Each
round has several steps. During the first step, each node calculates its constrained span. A
node is considered uncovered until it has the number of cluster heads it requires or all its
neighbors are cluster heads. With every additional cluster head a node acquires, it becomes
more “covered”. A node without a cluster head is completely uncovered. A node with one
cluster head is 1/k covered, with two cluster head 2/k covered and so on, where k is the
coverage requirement. A node that has a constrained span at least as large as any node in its
2 hop neighborhood elects itself as a candidate. Each candidate calculates its out-support, a
measure of its ability to cover other nodes. Each node calculates its in-support, an indicator
of the neighborhood’s ability to cover the node. A candidate becomes a cluster head with
probability 1/m, where m is the median in-support of all nodes in its neighborhood. A
node joins a cluster with probability 1/in − support.
5 RELATED WORK
In [15], cluster heads are chosen so that the energy consumption over the entire network is
even, ensuring that the network lives as long as possible. A fixed number of cluster head
candidates are selected and the cluster heads with the most residual energy are chosen from
that set. A node will choose a cluster head to ensure the overall energy consumption in the
entire network is even. Our algorithm, on the other hand, requires only local information
about the topology and residual energy.
In [8], a new, fully distributed approximation algorithm based on LP relaxation
techniques is presented.

For an arbitrary parameter k and maximum degree ∆, the

algorithm computes a dominating set of expected size O(k∆2/k )(log ∆ |DSOP T |)in O(k 2 )
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Algorithm 4 Distributed Multi-Path Randomized Greedy Algorithm
Require: Graph G = (V, E), constraint t(vi ) on vertices, the coverage requirement k for
a node, the number of current cluster heads ki of a node
Ensure: Subset D ⊆ V , set of currently chosen vertices
1: Span calculation: Compute the constrained span c(x) by computing the minimum of
the constraint and the sum of “coverdness” (ki /k) of the neighbors.
2: Candidate selection: Compute whether c(x) is at least as much as the constrained
span of each node within a distance of 2 from x . If so, x is a candidate.
3: Constrained support calculation: Let A(x) be the set of neighbors of x that are
candidates. Each y ∈ A(x) computes its constrained out-support:
sout (x) = P

c(y)
.
(k − ki /k)

Every node x computes its constrained in-support s(x) as
X
sin (x) =
sout (y).
y∈A(x)

P
Note that (k − ki /k) is the sum of coverage needs that lie in the neighborhood of y.
4: Dominator selection: If x is a candidate, find the median m of {sin (y) | y ∈
P
(k − ki /k)}. Let p = 1/m. With probability p, add x to D.
5: Neighbor selection: If x is selected as cluster head, for each neighbor y ∈
P
(k − ki /k), select y with probability 1/sin (x) such that y isn’t already covered by
x.
6: Go to the next round.

rounds where each node has to send O(k 2 ∆) messages of size O(log∆). This is the first
algorithm that achieved a non-trivial approximation ratio in a constant number of rounds.
The work described in [16] is a primal-dual based distributed algorithm for the
weighted, capacitated vertex cover problem. In [16] each vertex is assigned a weight, as
well as a capacity, and the goal is to minimize the sum of the weights without exceeding
the capacity of any vertex. The authors provide a (2 + ) OP T approximation algorithm.
Additionally the running time of the algorithm is shown to be O (log (nW ) /) where n
is the number of nodes and W = wtmax /wtmin is the ratio of the largest weight to the
smallest weight.
A randomized distributed algorithm that runs in O(log n log ∆ + 1) rounds and where
the size of the dominating set obtained is, with high probability, within O(log n) of the
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optimal, is presented in [13]. Our distributed algorithm is based on this algorithm and
extends its ideas to constrained vertices and applies it to wireless sensor networks.
In [17], an identity-based heuristic to form d-clusters in wireless ad-hoc networks
is presented in which d is a parameter. When the heuristic terminates, a node is either a
cluster head or at most d hops away from its cluster head.
A fast, distributed algorithm is presented in [18]. It is used to compute a small
k-dominating set D (for any fixed k) and its induced graph partition (which breaks the
graph into radius k clusters centered around the vertices of D). The time complexity of the
algorithm is O(k log∗ n), where log∗ is the inverse Ackermann function.
For the special family of graphs that represent ad hoc wireless networks modeled
as unit disk graphs, [19] introduces a two phase distributed polynomial time and message
complexity k-clustering approximation solution with O(k) worst case ratio over the optimal
solution.
In [20], a series of approximation algorithms for finding a small, weakly-connected
dominating set (WCDS) in a given graph is presented for use in clustering mobile ad hoc
networks. The main contribution of the work is a completely distributed algorithm for
finding small WCDS. Our work focuses on wireless sensor networks, whose challenges
differ from those of ad-hoc networks.
In [21], the authors provide three approximation algorithms for the minimum
connected dominating set (MCDS) in mobile ad hoc networks. The algorithms provide
P
approximation guarantees of 2H(∆)+1 and 2H(∆), where H(∆) = ∆
i=1 1/i ≤ ln ∆+1.
The guarantee of c + 1, applies to graphs where the maximum degree is ∆ and c is some
constant such that ∆ ≤ c. Our algorithm also considers dominating sets and provides
algorithms suited for wireless sensor networks.
The connected minimum dominating set is considered in [22]. The authors provide
two approximation algorithms which achieve approximation factors of 2H(∆) + 2 and
H(∆) + 2, where ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph and H is the harmonic function.
Several distributed poly-logarithmic time algorithms are presented in [5]. The algorithms compute connected and weakly connected dominating sets with an approximation
factor of O(log ∆), where ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph.
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6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In order to test the clustering algorithms, we implemented them in TinyOS and ran
simulations in TOSSIM [23]. We compared the iECDS and kECDS algorithms against the
ECDS and HEED algorithms [24]. A random topology was used for each simulation. We
ran a simulated 15 minutes for network sizes of 30, 45, 60, and 75 nodes. Our algorithms
are independent of the routing protocol used, but for these experiments we use the Surge
multi-hop application that is part of TinyOS. HEED and the ECDS algorithms also use
the Surge multi-hop routing protocol. Each node generates a reading every 20 seconds.
The cluster heads aggregate the readings and forward a single message. Surge uses a link
estimation and parent selection (LEPS) mechanism to determine multi-hop routes. All
traffic received at each node is monitored and used to update the internal neighbor table.
The neighbor table tracks all neighbors and selects the next hop based on shortest path
semantics. The default destination is the base station. We use a credit-point system for
updating the node energy budget as used with iHEED [7]. Energy is used for tasks such as
sending and receiving and points are deducted proportional to the actual amount of energy
used. Each nodes starts with the same amount of points and for each send/receive an
amount proportional to the size of the message is deducted. In our implementation, cluster
heads receive many more messages from nodes in their cluster than it sends messages to
nodes in its cluster. All messages are sent with the same power level, therefore we do not
consider the transmission distance when determining the cost of each send/receive [25].
For ECDS type algorithms, the initial energy allows for a constraint of about 20. Whenever
the network re-clusters, the constraint is updated and is based on the energy available at
each node. All kECDS algorithms run with k = 2, that is, a node can be up to two hops
from its cluster head. For each network size, the experiments were repeated 30 times.
We measured the number of rounds the algorithm executed until the entire network was
clustered. We compared the time of the first node’s deaths to the last node’s death. Having
all nodes die at approximately the same time provides the most useful WSN. Additionally,
we measured the time it took for the entire network to cluster. A fast clustering algorithm
ensures a useful WSN. We consider the energy used during the simulation and we look at
the energy usage per useful message received at the base station.
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Fig. 2. Rounds and Time to Cluster

6.1. Cluster Generation
In a distributed environment it is important to evaluate how long it takes for a clustering
protocol to finish. There are two measurements for WSN: time and the number of rounds
of execution. Figure 2(a) shows the average number of rounds to cluster the network for
various sizes. An ideal distributed clustering algorithm will cluster in a constant number of
rounds. Both the ECDS and the HEED algorithms execute in a constant number of rounds,
but the ECDS algorithms finished in fewer rounds. The algorithm depends on the routing
information obtained from the (independent) routing protocol. This routing information
may not be complete, especially in the earlier rounds. Incomplete routing information will
exclude some nodes from joining a cluster. Hence, additional rounds may be required.
kECDS finishes in the fewest number of rounds as nodes can join cluster heads up to khops away. Similar behavior can be seen in Figure 2(b), which shows the average time it
took for the networks to cluster. Clearly, the number of rounds and the time are related and
both are important measurements. An algorithm that runs over several short rounds may
still outperform an algorithm that runs in a constant number of long rounds. Again, it is
important that an algorithm takes a constant amount of time, independent of the size of the
network. Both the ECDS and the HEED algorithm take a constant amount of time, but the
ECDS algorithms are faster.
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Fig. 3. Dominating Set and Cluster Size

6.2. Cluster Goodness
Figure 3(a) shows the average size of the dominating set. The dominating set is the number
of cluster heads selected for each simulation run. Each node starts with the same amount
of energy, an amount that can support about 20 nodes in a cluster. The number of cluster
heads for kECDS grows slowly which means that the size of each cluster grows slowly
as the network gets larger. Knowing that a (near) constant number of cluster heads are
required can be used to support a few nodes with additional power, allowing them to act as
cluster heads for longer periods of time. iECDS and HEED increase the number of cluster
heads as the network grows; this indicates that the cluster size remains relatively constant
independent of the size of the network. Scalability is improved when clusters are of similar
size regardless of network size. iECDS uses the rounded constraint span, which allows
more candidates at each round, thus more cluster heads are selected. Figure 3(b) shows
the average number of nodes in each cluster. In kECDS the number of nodes assigned
to a cluster grows slowly, as predicted. The size decreases asymptotically for HEED and
seems to lead to very small clusters in large networks. As discussed, the cluster size remains
constant for iECDS. Not only the number of nodes in each cluster and the number of cluster
heads matter, but also how many of those clusters are single-node clusters (clusters in
which the cluster head is the only node). Single node clusters do not improve performance,
but they are generally unavoidable. A good algorithm will minimize the number of such
clusters. Figure 4(a) shows the average number of single node clusters. For ECDS the
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number of single node clusters decreases as the size of the network grows. ECDS choses
only neighbors which are “near” as cluster heads; some nodes will not be near a cluster
head and thus create single node clusters. As the network grows, each node has more
opportunities to find a near cluster head, hence the decrease. On the other hand, HEED’s
single node clusters increase in number as the network grows. kECDS has very few or no
single node clusters. In kECDS a node can join a cluster even if it is not “near” the cluster
head, as long as it within k-hops from the cluster head. This allows most nodes the option
of joining some cluster, reducing the number of single node clusters. iECDS, on the other
hand, has an increase in single node clusters. In iECDS more candidates and thus (more)
cluster heads are elected at each round. This can lead to a situation where a node finds itself
surrounded by cluster heads, without the ability to join any one of them. Such a node will
elect itself as cluster head as well.
6.3. Lifetime of Sensor Nodes
In a wireless sensor network, the early death of some nodes can disconnect other nodes
from the base station. This situation can lead to a reduced usefulness of the network because
some data cannot reach the base station. We measure lifetime in two ways: (1) the time
at which the first node dies and (2) the time at which the last node dies. The time at
which the first node dies is important because it can lead to a disconnection of part of the
network. The time at which the last node dies shows how long nodes are able to run the
protocol. Figure 4(b) shows the time at which the first node died. The time of the first death
asymptotically decreases in ECDS and is constant for HEED. kECDS and iECDS have no
death during the simulation. iECDS has more cluster heads with smaller cluster sizes,
leading to improved work distribution and energy usage. kECDS clusters faster, which
reduces the need for, and the number of, clustering and other “routing” messages. This
reduces the overall energy consumption giving the network a longer lifetime. Figure 5(a)
shows the time of death for the last node in the network. It is equally important that all
nodes die around the same time. A single node that outlives others by a large margin is of
little use. It can be estimated that the lifetimes will be similar for the ECDS and HEED
algorithms in large networks. For both ECDS and HEED the first and last deaths are within
200 seconds of each other, indicating an even energy consumption across the network.
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6.4. Energy Consumption
The amount of energy used during the execution of a protocol is very important in sensor
networks. Figure 5(b) shows the average energy consumption for the four protocols. The
energy consumption of the HEED algorithm is linear, while the energy consumption of the
ECDS algorithm is asymptotically decreasing. Both the kECDS and the iECDS algorithm
have linear consumption. As the networks grow larger, the energy consumption for ECDS
and HEED will be similar while kECDS and iECDS will remain about the same.
In sensor networks, the energy consumption for each message received should be
considered in addition to the overall energy consumption. A sensor network that uses very
little energy is not useful if it does not produce an adequate amount of data. Figure 6(a)
shows the average energy consumption for each message sent. Since the ECDS algorithms
cluster faster, they generate more usable data. All ECDS type algorithms outperform HEED
when the energy consumption is viewed in respect to the amount of data received.
Figure 6(b) we show the average energy used for communication per message sent.
Because communication is the most expensive operation in sensor networks, it is important
to measure its cost. This measurement must be considered in terms of the amount of data
generated in the network. A network with high communication energy consumption that
generates little data indicates that the protocols used requires too much communication
energy. Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) show the respective maximum and minimum energy
used by any node for each network size.
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It is important to have even energy consumption across the network. For all the ECDS
type algorithms, the maximum and minimum amount of energy consumed is close, while
HEED consumes at twice the rate of other algorithms. This is a strong indicator that the
energy consumption in the ECDS type algorithms is very even across the network, while
HEED has “hotspots” which use energy at twice the speed then other nodes. In HEED this
is a contributing factor to the early death of some nodes and the overall reduced lifetime of
the network.
7 CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, three improvements to the ECDS algorithm are presented to address
the problem of energy constrained clustering for wireless sensor networks. The first
improvement extends the ECDS algorithm to clusters where a node can be up to k hops
from its cluster head. This version is named kECDS. The second algorithm improves
ECDS by introducing the rounded span which allows a larger cluster head selection during
each round of the algorithm. This algorithm is called iECDS. The last algorithm extends
ECDS to be used with a multi-path routing protocol. This version of the algorithm allows
a node to choose up to m cluster heads, which provides robustness by enabling multi-path
routing. With mECDS, multi-path routing can be used not only from the cluster head to
the base station, but also from the node to one or more cluster heads. We proved that the
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kECDS and iECDS algorithms run in O(log n log ∆) rounds whp. The kECDS and iECDS
algorithms perform well on the random graphs in our simulations. Our simulations showed
that our algorithms perform very well in terms of time to cluster, cluster size, and energy
consumption. We compared our algorithms with the HEED algorithm. They outperformed
HEED in terms of cluster size, time to cluster, and energy consumption per message sent.
Future work will include extending the ECDS algorithm to work in a secure environment.
Currently, each node decides whether or not to become a cluster head. Each node has to
trust the information received from other nodes, which it uses to determine is cluster head
status. A node could avoid becoming a cluster head by misrepresenting its information, or
it may choose to be cluster head and use its status as message router to drop messages and
disable the network. We plan on extending the ECDS algorithms so that the cluster can be
formed securely, with a guarantee that all messages are received by the base station.
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ABSTRACT
When data are generated in sensor networks, highspeed data streams travel through the
network. Traditional security approaches are often unable to keep up with the rates of the
streams or they introduce overhead, which shortens the life of the network. The approach
proposed in this paper is one that solves the problems posed above. By embedding a
one-time pad, the actual value is distorted enough to make any information gleaned from
eavesdropping useless to an attacker. The use of the one-time pad ensures that the data were
indeed received from a particular sensor, and it gives adequate protection against injected
messages. The simulation shows this approach provides security with negligible overhead
while the throughput is similar to the same network without security.

1. INTRODUCTION
There are many possible applications of sensor networks from environmental monitoring to applications in military and homeland security [2]. Because radio communication
is the most expensive operation in terms of energy usage, research has focused on finding
ways to conserve energy [5]. Until recently, data security has received little consideration.
In order for ubiquitous computing to become a reality, system security and privacy
protection need to be assured. Securing data streams in sensor networks is important
because traditional encryption and authentication protocols such as TinySec are often
unable to keep up with high stream rates, and they deplete the network of energy too
quickly [8].
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The challenge in applying security to wireless sensor networks lies in the need to
balance data integrity, confidentiality, and availability as well as preserving constrained
energy resources. In sensor networks where radios are used for communication, an attacker
can easily acquire data by eavesdropping anywhere the signal is transmitted. New security
devices, methods, and approaches that safeguard sensitive data are needed. Among the
current research directions are efficient routing protocols [1], security schemes [8], and
data management tools such as aggregation and data fusion.
Previous works in data security include implementing link layer security for sensor
networks and public key cryptography using elliptic curves [8, 13]. These existing security
protocols must be adapted to work in sensor networks because sensor networks have
constraints on energy, communication and computation. Many other security protocols
cannot be adapted for sensor networks and thus we require new ways of providing
security. In [17], the authors consider the case of resilient rights protection of data
streams through watermarks. The protocol provides a way to identify the original owner
of a data stream. Given that the stream is available, this technique can be used to
determine whether the integrity of the data has been compromised; however no protection
against eavesdropping is provided. TinySec provides security through traditional link layer
encryption and authentication schemes using the RC5 or SkipJack ciphers [8]. As with any
cryptographic security scheme, TinySec increases the payload size of the packet, which
results in increased energy consumption. In [14], the authors introduce SPINS, a three-part
approach that provides authenticated streaming broadcast, data confidentiality, two-party
data authentication, and data freshness as well as an authenticated routing protocol. The
SNEP protocol of the SPINS suite of protocols provides data confidentiality. SNEP has
low communication overhead by only adding 8 bytes to the packet. The rates at which data
are produced may be much faster than the rates at which a security scheme can process
and secure the data. While there is a need to tightly encrypt some type of messages, in
which case a reduction in availability is often acceptable, other types of data may only
require a light security scheme but demand high availability. Many security schemes have
considered different approaches for messages in different levels in the network, but have not
considered different levels of security depending on the message type. This paper presents
a method to provide protection against passive eavesdropping by employing confidential
transmissions of data messages. For each transmission, a one-time pad (OTP) is created.
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A secret key and the MAC calculated over the data are used to create the OTP. When
the OTP is combined with the data, data encryption and data integrity are achieved at the
same time. The complete algorithmic details are given in Section 4. The PADS protocol
only adds 4 bytes, making it even more efficient than SNEP. Just as with SNEP, PADS
also provides data confidentiality and semantic security. Semantic security implies that
eavesdroppers cannot infer the data even if they see the same data encrypted several times.
The PADS protocol has dynamic key sizes and the ability to change the number of bytes
to be encrypted. By using one-to-one routing and pair-wise shared keys, data integrity is
guaranteed.
At the worst, the algorithms run in linear time on the size of the reading, regardless
of the size of the network. The correctness of the algorithms was proven and the theoretical
analysis of the energy usage shows that the application is appropriate for sensor networks.
Simulations have shown this protocol to be suitable for sensor networks. Refer to Section
6 where the simulation results are provided. The simulation shows that the overhead due to
the algorithm is negligible, and the performance of a network with the protocol is similar
to a network without additional security. Compared with a network using encryption and
authentication using TinySec, the performance of a network using this study’s protocol is
much better in terms of throughput, delay and energy consumption per message received
at the base station.

2. RELATED WORK
Researchers have investigated securing data in wireless sensor networks in order to
ensure that the base station can trust the answers it receives. The authors in [15] propose the
use of interactive proofs to force the aggregator to show that the answer previously provided
is a good approximation of the true value. An aggregator is a node that applies an aggregate
function such as a sum or average to all the data received from its child nodes. All types
of stealthy attacks by the aggregator are considered. A stealthy attack is an attack where
the aggregator wants the base station to accept results that are different from the true value,
while at the same time evading detection. The aggregate-commit-prove (ACP) protocol
works as follows. The aggregator collects the data and locally computes the aggregation
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results. Next, the aggregator calculates a commitment, which during the proving phase will
show that the aggregator used the values provided by the sensor to calculate the aggregation
value. Whenever the home server requests, the aggregator proves to the home server that
the result is valid. The home server checks to see if the aggregator is cheating, in the
sense that the aggregation result is or is not close to the correct result aggregated from the
committed data. In contrast, our work concentrates on securing the data on the routing
path. PADS provides security against an eavesdropper and would work well in conjunction
with ACP to provide confidentiality and integrity in wireless sensor networks.
The work in [17] is a novel idea to provide copyright protection to data stream owners
and authorized users. Consider the case where a stream is generated and safely transmitted
from the sensors to the base station. A watermark is applied to the stream at the base station.
The data are then transmitted to an authorized user. The owner and authorized users need
a way to show that the data were generated by them and they want to prove that the stream
was illegally obtained by the attacker. One commonly accepted way to prove ownership
is the use of embedded watermarks. This technique works by embedding a watermark bit
into major extremes, which are extremes that will survive any uniform sampling. Because
the watermark bits are embedded in the major extremes, they can then be extracted and
used to show copyright and ownership can be established. Extremes are chosen because
even after alteration and aggregation, most extremes will be recoverable and able to ensure
an overlap when rebuilding the watermark. During detection, all extremes, not just the
major ones, are identified, and the same selection criteria as during embedding are used to
identify the potential watermark recipients. For each selected extreme, its corresponding 1bit watermark is extracted and the global watermark is gradually reconstructed. Similarly,
PADS could be considered a watermark, which is embedded in the data, the difference
being that a new watermark is generated for each data item.
An example of stream security is [19]. The author explores message authentication
in sensor networks. He compares several authentication possibilities: end-to-end, hop-byhop, and physical and virtual multipath authentication. While end-to-end authentication
provides the greatest level of security, hop-by-hop authentication can be implemented with
relatively little overhead, but it provides security only against a very restricted attacker.
The author shows that physical multicast authentication provides a good intermediate level
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of security, and that virtual multicast authentication retains similar properties as physical
multicast authentication but also has reduced energy demands.
In contrast to our work on securing messages, Zhu et al. introduce a protocol that
provides protection against messages injected by an attacker with the goal to deceive the
base station or to shorten the lifetime of the network by depleting the resources of the
sensors in the network [21]. The authors present an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication
scheme, which guarantees that the base station will detect injected messages as long as
fewer than t nodes are compromised. When nodes are compromised, false messages are
created and injected in the network.

3. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
Sensor networks can be modeled as graphs. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph
with a set of n nodes V ⊂ R2 in the Euclidean plane and a set of m edges E ⊂ V 2 [16].
The vertices in this model represent the nodes in the sensor network and the edges represent
communication links between the nodes. While the network could be modeled as a directed
graph, only an undirected graph is considered and so only bi-directional links are modeled.
This study defines a round as a time interval in which each node is to send its gathered data
to the base station. In some cases, a sensor will continuously generate, process, and send
data as it monitors its environment.
A data stream is defined as an infinite set of values generated by a sensor.
Furthermore, each sensor node generates one data packet each round. While in many
cases the timestamp will be preserved, the notion of time is only introduced to show the
sequential nature of such data streams. The timestamp information may or may not be
routed with the data. In many cases the timestamps lose their meaning and as such, should
not be considered as important.
A sensor network most often generates numeric data, but at times may produce data
from other domains. However, this study consider all data only at the level of a string. All
data, whether numeric or not, are just a sequence of ones and zeros, and thus this research
technique will work equivalently on numeric or other data.
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The following assumptions are made. Each node shares a secret key with the
base station. This key is used to generate a new key for every transmission using a
key derivation function. This approach provides protection against an attacker who can
overhear transmissions and who can also inject false messages and nodes. The sensor
nodes can communicate with a powerful base station via relay nodes. A simple multi-hop
routing protocol is used [12] as shown in Figure 3.1. This study assumes that the base
station and the sensors are time synchronized, which can be handled as described in [3].
Here sensor nodes synchronize with their parent nodes in a hierarchical structure until a
synchronization chain has been built up to the root or base station. In cases where the
sensors send data at periodic intervals, an explicit synchronization exists given that each
packet has a sequential packet number. In aperiodic sensing of events the protocol in [3]
can be used to keep the network synchronized.
Definition 3.1: A message authentication code (MAC) is the result of applying a
public function to the input using a secret key. The MAC is of fixed length, is attached
to the input and serves to prove integrity and authenticity of the input. A MAC is also
known as a cryptographic checksum [18].
Definition 3.2: A MAC function is a function used to generate a MAC. A MAC
function has three properties.

It is a one-way function, that is, given a MAC it is

computationally infeasible to find the original input. It offers weak collision restistance,
that is, it is computationally difficult to find a second input (6= the first input) which
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produces the same MAC. It offers strong collision resistance, that is, it is computationally
difficult to find two inputs which produce the same MAC[18].
Definition 3.3: A CBCMAC function is a function which uses a block cipher in
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode to generate MAC codes. A CBCMAC is created by
encrypting the input into a chain of blocks, such that each block is dependent on the
previous block [18].
Definition 3.4: A one-time pad is a sequence of bits that is XOR to the reading in
order to provide protection against eavesdropping.
Definition 3.5: ki is the secret master key shared between node i and the base station.
The value of ki can be updated similar to updating keys in [22] and [14].
Definition 3.6: kij is the j th secret key shared between node i and the base station.
The key is periodically updated to guarantee freshness.
Definition 3.7: xij is the data value x generated at time j by node i. xi is the current
value of x generated by node i and p(xij ) is the packet generated by node i at time j, which
contains the sensor value x.
Definition 3.8: b(x) is the bit size of the value x. b(M AC) is the bit size of the
Message Authentication Code (M AC).
Definition 3.9: α determines the length of the subsequence of the M AC.

β

determines the starting location of the aforementioned subsequence of the M AC. α, β ∈ Z.

4. ALGORITHMS
The one-time pad is constructed by the nodes using only information contained within
the data packet and the secret key shared between the sender and the base station. First,
the M AC (message authentication code) is calculated based on the sensor reading. Next,
a one-time pad is constructed from the M AC and the key shared with the receiver. The
M AC is attached to the sensor reading. The variables α and β are calculated based on the
M AC, and a subsequence of the M AC is extracted and used to secure the sensor reading.
The receiving node uses the attached M AC, removes the encryption, and calculates its
own M AC. To show that the message has not been tampered with, the two M ACs are
compared for equality.
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4.1. Embedding Of A One-Time Pad

Algorithm 1 Basic Embedding Algorithm: embed
Require: kij , packet p(xi ) of sensor value xi
Ensure: p(xi ) XOR with the one-time pad
1: calculate M AC over p(xi ) (excluding routing information, see Figure 4.1) and save in
p(xi )
2: ktime = kij modified and time synced
3: α = ktime mod b(M AC) + 1
4: β = ktime mod (b(M AC) − α + 1)
5: temp pad = substring of M AC starting at α for β bits
g = Append temp pad to pad
g until pad
g is of the same length as the data
6: pad
g
7: xei = xi XOR pad
8: Replace xi with xei in p(xi ) and send

Refer to Algorithm 1 for details on the embedding algorithm.

This algorithm

calculates a M AC over the static part of the packet. Multi-hop routing needs to change
the packet header to properly route the packet, so only the part of the packet that does not
change is used, as shown in Figure 4.1. The calculated M AC is appended to the data and
the secret key shared between the sender and the receiver is used to create a time synced
key. For example, at time t, every tth bit of the key is dropped. This ensures that an
attacker has to be time synced with the network in order to break the encryption. Time
synchronization is handled similarly to [20]. It is important to note that our algorithm
will work without time synchronization, but time synchronization provides for dynamic
adjustment to the keys, thus providing added security. The next step is to calculate the
length of the substring and the starting position of the substring. This study calculates α
by taking the secret key modulo the length of the M AC in bits. β is calculated by taking
the key modulo the length of the M AC minus α plus 1; this ensures that the substring
will exist. The substring is of length α bits, so the last α bits for the source string cannot
be the starting point of the substring. The final steps involve generating the one-time pad
by repeatedly concatenating the substring to a target string until the target string is of the
same length as the static portion of the packet to be secured. In most cases that will be the
payload plus some portion of the packet header as shown in Figure 4.1. The study then
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Fig. 4.1. Multihop packet structure. The fields shaded gray are protected by the MAC
calculation.

encrypts the data that are transmitted by XORing the generated one-time pad to the value
xi and then transmits the packet.
4.2. Detection Of A One-Time Pad
The detection process works very similarly to the embedding process. This is
necessary in order to find the embedded pad, remove it, and return to the original sensor
value. The detection and removal of the one-time pad is done by the base station, because
only the base station shares the secret key with the embedding sensor node.
Because sensor networks communicate via wireless mediums, there exists a natural
probability of collisions, dropped packets, or corrupted packets. Any of these problems
will be detected by this protocol. If the M AC or the payload of a packet is corrupted, then
the M AC calculated by the receiver will not match the one from the sender.
In order to retrieve the original data, the detection process described in Algorithm 2
is used. This study uses the M AC calculated by the sender and stored in the packet to
g and remove it from the packet. Then the M AC is calculated just like
calculate the pad
the sender, and the two M ACs are compared. If they match, then processing the packet
continues.
4.3. Example
The following is an example of Algorithm 1 executed at node X and Algorithm 2
executed at the base station, along with the intermediate steps. X senses an event, does
the embedding, and transmits the data to the base station. Then the base station does the
detection.
Step 1: Embedding at Node X. X senses an event and generates the value xX =
00011110 10011011. X calculates the M AC with the secret key kij using SkipJack in the
CBCMAC mode, as implemented by [8] over xX .
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Algorithm 2 Basic Detection Algorithm: wm detect
Require: kij packet p(xei ) of sensor value
Ensure: p((xi ) the original packet with the original sensor value xi
1: Take the M AC calculated by the sender
2: ktime = kij modified and time synced
3: α = ktime mod b(M AC) + 1
4: β = ktime mod (b(M AC) − α + 1)
5: temp pad = substring of M AC starting at β for α bits
g until pad
g is of the same length as the
g = repeatedly concatenate temp pad to pad
6: pad
static portion of the packet.
g
7: xi = xei XOR pad
8: calculate M AC over p(xi ) and compare to M AC received with packet
9: if The two M AC’s match then
10:
Packet was not altered
11: else
12:
Packet was altered
13: end if

M ACxX ,kij = 01100000 01111100 11011111 11001010.
Algorithm1:Line3 α = ktime mod 32 + 1 = 00101001
Algorithm1:Line4 β = ktime mod (32 - α + 1) = 2
Algorithm1:Line5 temp pad = subsequence of M AC starting at 29 for 2 = 11
g = 11111111 11111111
Algorithm1:Line6 pad
Algorithm1:Line7 xi (old) = 00011110 10011011 xi (new) = 11100001 01100100
Step 2: Detection at the base station. BS receives the value of xi = 11100001
01100100 from node X with the stored M AC = 01100000 01111100 11011111 11001010.
Algorithm2:Line3 α = ktime mod 32 + 1 = 00101001
Algorithm2:Line4 β = ktime mod (32 - α + 1) = 2
Algorithm2:Line5 temp pad = subsequence of M AC starting at 29 for 2 = 11
g = 11111111 11111111
Algorithm2:Line6 pad
Algorithm2:Line7 xi (old) = 11100001 01100100 xi (new) = 00011110 10011011
Algorithm2:Line8 BS calculates the M AC over xi (new) = 01100000 01111100
11011111 11001010.
Algorithm2:Line9 M AC’s match, data was not altered.
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5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyse the security of our proposed algorithm, we look at the message
authenticy and message integrity as well as the confidentiality provided by the OTP.
5.1. Message Integrity And Authenticity
The message integrity of the one-time pad protocol is based on the security of the
MAC. The MAC used in the simulations is a CBC-MAC implemented by TinySec. It uses
a MAC of 4 bytes. Using a 4 byte MAC, there is a 1 in 232 chance that an attacker is able
to create a MAC and have it be an exact match. Overall, after about 231 such attempts an
attacker should have made a match. The assumption is that the MAC can only be verified
by sending it to an authorized receiver. The attacker notes if the message is validated by
the receiver. The attacker would have to send 231 messages, on average. In traditional
networks such a number is not much, however in sensor networks it will provide a level
of security that is sufficient. Most radios channels in sensor networks operate at 19.2kb/s
and it would take an attacker about 8 months to send 231 messages of 23 bytes each. This
exceeds the lifetime of most sensor networks. Additionally, our protocol uses a new key for
each transmission, therefore an attacker cannot learn anything about future transmissions
from the past.
5.2. Confidentiality
The security of the OTP depends on the security of the key ktime . Since a new key
is generated at each transmission the security of the protocol depends on the security of
the key derivation function (KDF) as described in the IEEE Standard Specifications for
Public-Key Cryptography [6]. Under the assumption that the KDF is secure the problem
reduces to the ability of an attacker to randomly create a one-time pad and have it match.
The size of the one-time pad is equal to the size of the data to be protected, we assume 5
bytes throughout this work. That is equal to a 1 in 264 chance of randomly having the right
string or an average of 232 tries until a correct one is found. At almost 16 months that is
well over the lifetime of the typical sensor network.
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6. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS
To analyze the suitability of the algorithms for sensor networks, we consider cost of
running the algorithm in terms of computational complexity and in terms of energy. We
also show the correctness of the algorithms.
6.1. Cost Analysis
The embedding and the detection algorithms are very similar. The calculation of the
MAC using an appropriate algorithm takes O(b(xi )) time, where b(xi ) is the bit size of the
input, not the size of the network. This study uses the SkipJack algorithm in the analysis.
All other lines have complexity O(1). Thus, the running time of the complete embedding
and detection algorithms is O(b(xi )).
While the program space is of concern in sensor programming, this research is
primarily concerned with the size of the memory necessary to perform the computation
depending on the input size b(xi ). The algorithm neither increases nor decreases the size
of the measured value. The memory requirements for any of the variables used in the
algorithm is rather small; however, the requirements of the SkipJack algorithm are large in
comparison. The memory requirements of the SkipJack algorithm are independent of the
size of the input, but because it has been implemented for TinyOS as part of the TinySec
project, it is known that the size is small enough to work [8].
6.2. Correctness
Claim 6.1: The embedding algorithm 1 correctly embeds a one-time pad in the
sensed value.
proof

A sensor value xi of b(xi ) = 1 is given. The calculation of the M AC in line 1 of

Algorithm 1 results in a M AC of 4 bytes. The calculation of α and β on lines 3 and 4 of
algorithm 1 are as follows. The calculation of α will result in a value of [1, b(M AC)). The
calculation of β will result in a value of [0, b(M AC) − α + 1). Because α is subtracted
from the bitsize of the M AC, it is confirmed that the substring temp pad will in fact exist.
g is the
Then temp pad is repeated until b(temp pad) = b(xi ). Thus, the one-time pad pad
g with the reading, the data are securely encrypted.
same length as the data, and by XOR pad
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It is hypothesized that for all l less then m, such that |xi | = l it implies that the onetime pad used to secure the reading is of the same length as the reading. In other words,
∀l, l ≤ m, |xi | = l ⇒ successful embedding of the one-time pad.
Now, it will be shown that |xi | = m has proper embedding ⇒ |xi | = m+1 has proper
embedding. By adding an additional bit to xi , the M AC calculated will be different, but
the values of α and β still result in a value of [1, b(M AC)) and [0, b(M AC) − α + 1),
respectively. The calculation of temp pad on line 5 of algorithm 1 will still result in a
proper substring of the M AC and thus a proper one-time pad, and hence the embedding is
done properly.
Claim 6.2: The detection algorithm 2 detects the embedded one-time pad in a
received value and restores the sensed value.
Again, the smallest permissible length of the values of xi is one. A sensor value

proof

xi with |xi | = 1 is given. The calculations of α and β on lines 3 and 4 of Algorithm 2
using the M AC received as part of the packet result in the values of [1, b(M AC)) and
0, b(M AC) − α + 1), respectively. If the M AC was not modified during transmission, then
this guarantees that the same α and β will be calculated. Naturally, it also implies that the
same temp pad will be extracted. Because the size of the reading is fixed in the network,
g will be generated and thus can successfully be removed from the packet. The
the same pad
calculation of the M AC is over the same data as at the embedding location, and it will only
result in a successful outcome if the data were not modified during transmission.
It is hypothesized that for all l less then m, such that |xi | = l it implies that the
embedding can be found during detection and the original value can be restored. In other
words, ∀l, l ≤ m, |xi | = l ⇒ successful detection and removal of the one-time pad.
Next it will be shown that |xi | = m has proper detection ⇒ |xi | = m + 1 has proper
detection. By adding an additional bit to xi , the M AC calculated will be different, but the
values of α and β will still result in a value of [1, b(M AC)) and [0, b(M AC) − α + 1),
respectively. The calculation of temp pad on line 5 of Algorithm 1 will still result in a
proper substring of the M AC and thus a proper one-time pad. Thus, the detection is done
properly.
6.3. Energy Use Analysis
Law, Doumen, and Hartel showed that while there are some difference in the number
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of clock cycles an instruction will take, the differences are not statistically significant [9].
Therefore, the computational complexity of an algorithm can be directly translated to
energy consumption, assuming that the energy per CPU cycle is fixed. In [4] the authors
showed that the SkipJack cipher uses 15925 cycles. The algorithms in the current research
add an additional 20 instructions per algorithm. Because the average instruction takes 400
cycles, these algorithms add an additional 8000 cycles for a total of 23925 cycles for the
application [11]. The MICA2 motes use 4 nJ per cycle [7]. Thus, the expected energy
consumption for the embedding and detection algorithms is 95700 nJ. The average AA
battery contains 1000 Joules. Because the MICA2 motes operates on two AA batteries,
the energy consumption of both the embedding and detection algorithms is appropriate for
sensor networks.

7. SIMULATION
PADS was simulated using the TinyOS operating system and its simulator TOSSIM [10].
It was compared to other protocols using a fixed topology for each simulation.

In

all simulations, every node in the network generates and sends a packet about every
five seconds. The comparison included routing with non-secure AODV, with the PADS
technique, and with TinySec [8]. Each simulation ran for a simulated 10 minutes, and
for each network size the simulation was repeated five times. The average of the five
simulations was used for the evaluation. For each set of simulations, five sizes of networks
were compared: 15 nodes, 30 nodes, 45 nodes, 60 node and 75 nodes. Three different sets
of simulations were performed. The first set compared same sized messages; all messages
had a size of 23 bytes no matter the protocol. We ran simulations using the same size
message to study the performance, as communication costs mainly depend on the size of
the message. Since larger messages would require more energy to transmit any difference
in performance can be attributed to sources other then message size. This allowed us to
remove any doubt regarding what contribution the message size has on the performance. In
order to achieve this, messages in non-secure AODV had payloads of seven bytes, PADS
had payloads of three bytes and TinySec used payloads of two bytes. In the second set
of simulations we are using the three protocols using messages with a two byte payload
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resulting in messages of 18 bytes, 22 bytes and 23 bytes for non-secure AODV, PADS
and TinySec, respectively. The latency (average time it takes a packet to reach the base
station), the throughput of bits per second (bps), and the average energy used per node
were evaluated. We calculated the standard error for each measure. Two measures are
considered to be statistically different if their error bars do not overlap.
7.1. Comparison Of Protocols With Total Message Size Of 23 Bytes
In order to see the impact the protocol has on network performance, we simulated using the three algorithms (PADS, TinySec and non-secure AODV) while limiting messages
to 23 bytes. In this set of experiment each message has 23 bytes, resulting in payloads of 2
bytes for TinySec, 3 bytes for PADS and 7 bytes for non-secure AODV. Any differences in
performance can be attributed to the protocols as the size of the messages is the same.
7.1.1. Latency
It is important to know what delay creating and applying the one-time pad adds. Each
packet was timestamped when sent in the application layer at the sending node and again
when received in the application layer at node 0. The time it took for a packet to travel from
the application layer in the sending node to the receiving point in the application layer was
measured. The difference is the travel time of a packet.
Figure 7.1a) shows the average latency per packet for various network sizes. It is
easy to see that the latencies for non-secure AODV and the PADS protocol are similar.
The only statistically significant difference between PADS and non-secure AODV is at 30
nodes. One of the simulations for the non-secure network had congestion, resulting in
several hundred messages with latencies well above 1 second, while the average for the
rest of the simulations was closer to 0.14 seconds. This caused the average latency to be so
high. However, it seems that TinySec has an average latency that is much better then either
of the two other protocols. A closer look at the data revealed that TinySec, on average
sends 16 times as many messages as are being received. Figure 7.2a) shows the ratio of
Sent Message to Received Messages, the failure rate, for the three protocols. It is worthy to
note, that the ratio is similar for PADS and for networks with non-secure AODV. TinySec,
on the other hand quickly reaches ratios of more then five messages send for each message
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received. The reason is that TinySec, due to the lengthy encryption/decryption processes,
at each node drops messages, especially at nodes which are utilized as relay nodes.

Fig. 7.1. Messages of 23 Bytes for Various Protocols

Another important metric is the average latency per total number of hops traveled.
It is expected that the latency increases as a message has to travel multiple hops. Figure
7.2b) shows the average latency per hop. Note how the slop of the increase is similar for
PADS and networks with non-secure AODV. At 4 and 6 hops, respectively, the simulations
for non-secure AODV resulted in a lower number of received messages, which inflates the
average latency for those hop counts. At 11 the network with non-secure AODV had very
little congestion resulting in about 15% of the messages having average latencies below 0.1
seconds. This reduced the overall average latency for messages with that hop count. At
14 hops, PADS had a particularly congested network, resulting in a higher then expected
average latency. TinySec seems to have an average per hop latency much better then either
of the other protocols. Considering the low success rate of received messages as well as the
fact that despite using a fixed topology in each simulation, there are no simulations using
TinySec with hop counts greater than 9 hops, the overall performance of TinySec is much
worse then PADS.
7.1.2. Throughput
Another important consideration in a sensor network is the throughput. Because the
usefulness of sensor networks lies in independently sensing and sending large amounts of
data, any technique must be able to sustain high data rates. Again, PADS is compared to
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Fig. 7.2. Messages of 23 Bytes for Various Protocols

no security and TinySec encryption and authentication. As is evident from Figure 7.1b),
the throughput of PADS is close to that of a network with non-secure AODV. The only
noteworthy difference is for networks of 75 nodes. Of the 5 simulations, 2 had very high
failure rates, resulting in only a few hundred received messages when almost 9000 were
sent. This causes a lower than expected throughput. On the other hand, TinySec encryption
and authentication results in greatly reduced throughput.
7.1.3. Energy Cost
The amount of energy available in sensor networks is very limited. Any sensor
network protocol needs to be energy aware. Since the energy available to sensor networks
is limited, the energy consumption of any application is critically important. PADS
is compared to non-secure AODV and to TinySec using encryption and authentication.
During simulation each network sends different amounts of messages. In order to have
an accurate picture of the energy usage in a network and what the true cost of sending
a data message is, we calculate the average amount of energy used per data message
received. Figure 7.1c) shows the average amount of energy used per node per message
sent for various network sizes. The difference for networks with 45 nodes is because the
networks with non-secure AODV had high failure rates on average resulting in a high
energy consumption per message received. It is important to note, that TinySec always
uses significantly more energy then the other protocols no matter the network sizes. The
reason for the much higher energy consumption per message for TinySec is that we are
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measuring the energy used per message received at the base station and the failure rate for
TinySec is much higher than the other networks.
7.2. Comparison Of Protocols With 2 Byte Payload
In most applications of sensor networks, the payload remains stable and depending
on other protocols used, such as AODV for multi-hop routing and TinySec for security,
the total message size may vary. In this set of experiments, each message generated has
a payload of 2 bytes, resulting in message sizes of 18 bytes for networks with non-secure
AODV, 22 bytes for PADS and 23 bytes for TinySec.
7.2.1. Latency
The average latency for the three protocols is shown in Figure 7.3a). The average
latency increases at a similar pace for the PADS protocol as well as for non-secure AODV.
On average the PADS networks with 30 nodes experienced more congestion which lead
to a higher latency. Again TinySec seems to outperform both the network with non-secure
AODV as well as the proposed PADS protocol. However, when considering the low success
rate for TinySec, performance is no longer adequate.

Fig. 7.3. Messages with 2 Byte Payload for Various Protocols

7.2.2. Throughput
Figure 7.3b) shows the comparison of the throughput in bps. As expected, the
PADS protocol and non-secure AODV behave in a similar fashion. The only statistically
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significant difference between PADS and non-secure AODV is at 60 nodes. This is
because two simulations produced less then 800 messages while the three other simulations
produced more then 1800 messages. Hence the congestion decreased the average bps for
PADS networks with 60 nodes. The performance of TinySec is much worse then either
of the other two protocols since TinySec received many fewer messages then either of the
other two protocols.
7.2.3. Energy Cost
The average energy consumption per message sent was measured and compared for
different size networks for each of the three protocols where each message had a 2 byte
payload. Figure 7.3c) shows the result of this simulation. TinySec’s energy consumption
per message is much higher then the other two protocols, this stems from the fact that
in TinySec much fewer messages are received. There are no statistically significant
differences between the PADS protocol and non-secure AODV.

8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has shown that data in sensor networks can be securely routed through
the network. By embedding a one-time pad to encrypt the payload of a message, the
actual value transmitted is distorted so that any eavesdropper will not be able to use
the information. Additionally, it is possible to ensure that the data were generated by
a trusted source because the construction of the one-time pad will fail if any messages
have been corrupted or were injected. The correctness of the two algorithms presented has
been proven and an analysis of the time and space complexity required by the algorithms
has been given. The simulations have shown that the additional work required by these
algorithms is negligible and the performance rivals that of a network without security. The
one-time pad protocol outperforms a network with encryption and authentication using
TinySec. The throughput of this approach is as good as one without security and better
then with Tinysec. Future work will include applying the one-time pad protocol to data
aggregation and data fusion.
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Abstract—Communication in wireless sensor networks uses the majority of a
sensor’s limited energy. Using aggregation in wireless sensor network reduces the
overall communication cost.

Security in wireless sensor networks entails many

different challenges. Traditional end-to-end security is not suitable for use with innetwork aggregation. A corrupted sensor has access to the data and can falsify
results. Additively homomorphic encryption allows for aggregation of encrypted
values, with the result being the same as the result when unencrypted data was
aggregated.

Using public key cryptography, digital signatures can be used to

achieve integrity. We propose a new algorithm using homomorphic encryption and
additive digital signatures to achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability for innetwork aggregation in wireless sensor networks. We prove that our digital signature
algorithm which is based on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
is as secure as ECDSA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are self-organizing networks of small, battery
powered sensors used to monitor the environment for events such as forest fires, pollutant
levels or enemy troop movements. A large number of small, battery powered computing
devices with built-in radios are spread over the area to be monitored. Upon activation, these
sensors self-organize into a multi-hop network, which connects to the users via a powerful
base station in order to achieve a common goal [1]. As each sensor surveys the area within
its sensing range, the data is sent towards the base station along a multi-hop path. A WSN
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Fig. I.1. Motivating Example

is able to remotely cover a large sensing area since these low-cost sensors organize into a
multi-hop network without human assistance.
Since sensors are typically battery powered and a WSN contains thousands of
sensors, replacing the batteries is not a possibility. In terms of energy usage, communication is much more expensive than any internal computations [2]. In in-network
aggregation, intermediate results are calculated along the multi-hop path whenever two or
more messages are routed along the same path. Depending on the routing structure, energy
savings may be by as much as eight times [3]. Consider the network depicted in Figure I.1.
Without aggregation, a total of 9 + 12 + 13 = 34 messages are sent; with aggregation, only
9 + 3 + 1 = 13 messages are sent. Through the sample network in Figure I.1 it is clear
that in-network aggregation greatly reduces the number of messages sent in a WSN, which
leads to large energy savings.
Security in WSNs includes confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality
in sensor networks is accomplished by preventing outsiders from eavesdropping on
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transmissions. This is generally achieved by encrypting the relevant parts of a packet.
Integrity in general means that the receiver is assured that the packet was not tampered
with or the message altered in some way. By ensuring availability we mean that the
data is available in a timely fashion so that it is useful to the user. Availability in sensor
networks is of great concern to the user of the network. Unfortunately, many existing
security primitives cannot be used in sensor networks, either because the computing power
of the sensors is too limited or the additional work created by the protocols causes excessive
network traffic [4].
Sensors in the network can become corrupted due to the environment such as water,
wind or sand acting on the sensor. In hostile environments, a sensor may deliberately be
corrupted by an attacker. A corrupted sensor may appear to participate in the mission
of the network but falsify sensor readings, improperly apply an aggregation function,
exclude legitimate messages from the aggregate result or create a fictitious result. A sensor
corrupted by an attacker may behave in this way in order to get the base station to accept
an incorrect result that is favorable to the attacker. Hence in order to securely aggregate
data in a sensor network, we must not only provide protection against eavesdroppers, but
we should also prevent intermediate sensors from having access to the data.
Homomorphic encryption schemes are one possibility of ensuring secure aggregation, as they allow data aggregation to be performed on encrypted data. Encryption and
decryption operations are computationally very expensive and time consuming. In linklayer cryptography [5], the data is encrypted by the sender, decrypted at intermediate nodes,
the aggregation function is applied and the result is encrypted again before being sent to
the next hop; this can lead to overflowing queues. In homomorphic encryption certain
aggregation functions such as sum and average can be calculated on the encrypted data,
reducing the workload of the sensors in the network significantly. The data is encrypted and
sent toward the base station, while sensors along the path apply the aggregation function on
the encrypted data. The base station receives the encrypted aggregate result and decrypts it.
In section II we describe the scheme of homomorphic encryption in detail. Homomorphic
encryption schemes provide security against eavesdroppers and protect the aggregate result
from being known by intermediate, possibly corrupted sensors.
Integrity of the aggregate result can easily be achieved on a hop-by-hop basis
in wireless sensor networks. Achieving end-to-end integrity while allowing for data
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aggregation provides us with new challenges. We need to clarify the meaning of integrity
when data aggregation is applied. In aggregation integrity implies that any aggregate result
is made up of only legitimate data without inclusions or additions, and that corrupted
sensors cannot interfere with operations of the aggregation. We want to be able to assure
the base station that the aggregate result it receives is a fair representation of the network
state.
In this paper we introduce a novel way to provide confidential and integrity preserving
aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In section III we propose the use of homomorphic
encryption in WSN in order to achieve:
• A solution for confidentially calculating the SUM and AVERAGE in a wireless
sensor network. Our algorithm is present in Section IV.
• A solution for integrity preserving data aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
We are using an additively digital signature algorithm based on ECDSA to achieve
integrity of the aggregate result. We provide security analysis of the algorithm in
Section V.

II. BACKGROUND
In sensor networks, data aggregation provides energy savings. The lifetime of most
networks is limited and it is important for protocols to be energy-efficient. Combining
multiple payloads into one message or combining data by allowing for in-network
calculation of aggregates leads to these energy savings [6].
In many proposed applications of wireless sensor networks, the networks generate
large amounts of data in a continuous stream, making it difficult for a user to sift useful
information from these masses of data [7]. Sensors may generate a reading of their
environment every three seconds until the mission is completed; for a 100 sensor network,
this would generate 300 messages every three seconds, or 6000 messages every minute.
In-network aggregation can take this amount of data and combine it into one or more
aggregated results every minute.
Calculating aggregate results such as SUM or AVERAGE is of special interest to
sensor networks. Wireless sensor networks are designed to provide large amounts of data,
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which is a snapshot of the environment at one point in time. Combining several readings
by calculating the AVERAGE or the SUM increases the accuracy of these readings [8].
Security in sensor networks requires new approaches due to the limitations of
sensors and their limited computing power. Since a sensor network uses radio as the
communication medium, all communications are inherently insecure. Anybody tuned
to the same channel is able to eavesdrop on the transmissions. Many sensor network
applications demand secure communications. Encryption is the preferred way to provide
for a secure communication channel. Encryption ensures that only the sender and the
intended receiver can read the message contents [9]. Traditional link-layer cryptography is
an important part of an overall security strategy for sensor networks.
TinySec [5], an implementation of link-layer cryptography for TinyOS, has two
operational modes: hop-by-hop (HBH) and end-to-end (ETE). ETE provides total security,
as only the sender and the receiving base station are able to know the content of the
message. Unfortunately, this also means that aggregation is not possible, because the
intermediate nodes cannot access the payload. TinySec uses the SkipJack cipher, which
does not allow for calculating of aggregate functions such as SUM or AVERAGE on
encrypted data. When TinySec is used in HBH mode instead, the message is decrypted
at each hop, and aggregation is possible. Due to the amount of time required for the
encryption and decryption operations, the queues in a WSN can overflow, leading to
dropped packets. Other drawbacks are that TinySec is based on private key cryptography,
which leads to problems such as key distribution, key management, and that digital
signatures are not possible [10].
In private key cryptography, both parties use the same key. Deciding when and how
two sensors agree on which key to use is a big challenge. A private key cryptography
approach also means that a sensor needs to store one key for every other sensor it wishes
to communicate with. In WSN, the topology of the network can change, and protocols
need to be flexible enough to allow for two previously unassociated sensors to begin
communicating securely. One possible solution is a network-wide key, but the obvious
problem with this approach is that only one corrupted sensor is required to compromise
communications in the entire network.
Since all parties in private key cryptography use the same key, digital signatures are
not feasible. In order to achieve integrity Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are used.
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MACs are used to prove that the message has not been tampered with. Since sender and
receiver share the same key, it cannot be proven who sent the message. A public key
cryptography approach addresses many of these problems [11]. Public key cryptography
allows for the application of digital signatures. Digital signatures provide integrity and
repudiation. Only the party in possession of the private key can create a particular signature.
When a message with a signature is received, the corresponding public key is used to verify
the signature. Once the signature is verified, the receiver can be certain that the integrity
of the message has not been breached. The receiver is also certain that only the sender in
possession of the private key could have created that signature.
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique which allows calculations to
be performed on aggregate data. Specifically, a homomorphic encryption scheme allows
the following property to hold:
enc(a ⊕ b) = enc(a) ⊕ enc(b).
This means that in order to calculate the SUM of two values, we can apply some
function to their encrypted counterparts and then decrypt the result of the SUM operation.
Clearly, considering the cost of encryption and decryption, homomorphic encryption is
useful in wireless sensor networks, because homomorphic encryption would allow for the
calculation of SUM and AVERAGE on encrypted data. The data would be encrypted at the
sensor node, the SUM or AVERAGE would be calculated as the aggregate result follows
a path to the base station, and the final result would be decrypted at the base station. Any
eavesdropper would be unable to gather information from the transmissions. Any corrupted
sensor could not know the aggregate result. An example of an homomorphic cryptography
scheme is the elliptic curve ElGamal system [12]. The EC ElGamal system is additively
homomorphic because the following property holds:
enc(a + b) = enc(a) + enc(b).
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) employs the points on an elliptic curve over a finite
field K. The required algorithms for elliptic curve cryptography can easily be implemented,
even on small devices such as sensors [13]. Elliptic curve cryptography uses the analog of
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the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), also known as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (EC-DLP). The DLP over elliptic curves is believed to computationally much
more difficult then DLP over finite fields of the same size [10].
Homomorphic encryption does not provide integrity. Since we are using public key
elliptic curve cryptography we will use digital signatures to provide integrity. Digital
signature schemes are not homomorphic. That is two signatures generated on two different
messages cannot be combined to verify the sum of the messages. We propose the use
of an encryption scheme which will allow for homomorphic signature generation and
verification.
III. APPROACH
We propose to use the EC-ElGamal system for homomorphic encryption in wireless
sensor networks. In [11] the authors evaluated several public key homomorphic encryption
schemes for use on sensors. The authors in [14] use an implementation of the EC-ElGamal
algorithms for homomorphic encryption and storage in sensor networks. The EC-ElGamal
system is thus clearly suitable for wireless sensor networks. Instead of applying EC-EG
(EC-ElGamal) for persistent data storage, we propose to use it for homomorphic data
encryption during transmission. The work in [11] provides for data confidentiality only.
We propose the use of elliptic curve digital signatures to provide message integrity and
integrity of the aggregate in addition to data confidentiality.
We will now provide an explanation of the example in Figure III.1. Each node
generates a reading. The reading is signed with the aggregate signature protocol using
the node’s private key; this is shown as Sig(x). Each node homomorphically encrypts
the reading with the base stations’ public key; this is shown as Enc(x) in Figure III.1.
The node sends the secured reading, the signature and its public key to its parent. After
receiving messages from all its children, the parent combines the messages into one. The
parent sums the secured readings, the signatures and the public keys. If the parent also
contributes a reading, that reading is treated like any other reading. These are shown as
SU M − EN C, SU M − SIG and SU M − KEY in Figure III.1. This is process is
repeated by each parent along the path to the base station.
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Enc(23), Sig(23), PK(5,2)
Enc(3), Sig(3), PK(10,12)

Enc(2), Sig(2), PK(5,13)

SUM-ENC = ENC(70)
SUM-SIG(70)
SUM-PK(12, 25)

Enc(5), Sig(5), PK(8, 10)

A

Enc(16), Sig(16), PK(6, 12)
B

Enc(31), Sig(31), PK(15, 20)
SUM-ENC=ENC(62)
SUM-SIG(62)
SUM-PK(18, 10)

Enc(12), Sig(12), PK(6,6)

Enc(4), Sig(4), PK(4,1)

Enc(22), Sig(22), PK(10, 19)
Enc(9), Sig(9), PK(19, 10)
Enc(18), Sig(18), PK(13, 10)
SUM-ENC=ENC(91)
SUM-SIG(91)
SUM-PK(51, 42)

C

Enc(35), Sig(35), PK(5, 19)
Enc(43), Sig(43), PK(22, 28)

SUM-ENC=ENC(223)
SUM-SIG(223)
SUM-PK(42, 42)

Base
Station

Dec(Enc(223) = 223
SIG(Dec(Enc(223)) = SUM-SIG(223)

Fig. III.1. Homomorphic Encryption Example

The base station decrypts the received message. The sum of the readings was
homomorphically encrypted with the base stations public key. This allows the base station
to decrypt the readings. Only the base station which is in possession of the matching private
key is able to decrypt the readings. This is shown as Dec(Enc(x)) in the figure. Each node
signed its messages, and these signatures were combined along the way. The base station
can now verify the sum of the signatures given the sum of the public keys. The aggregate
signature protocol ensures that only readings from legitimate sensors are included in the
aggregate.
IV. ALGORITHMIC DETAILS
We first describe the details for the algorithm executed at the sensors. Each sensor is
pre-loaded with the appropriate elliptic curve parameters, the base stations’ public key and
a network wide random integer. The integer is used to generate a new k at set intervals.
This ensures that the signatures are additive and secure against attacks. At the start of
each round, each sensor choses a private key and computes the appropriate public key.
Choosing a private key is straightforward and requires the sensor to pick an integer in the
field of the elliptic curve. The public key is generated by multiplying the base point T
with the private key; the result is another point on the curve. A new public/private key pair
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is necessary during each round of processing because it would only take two signatures
for a malicious node to determine another node’s private key. If a sensor signs the same
reading with the same key, another sensor would be able to determine the private key. In
most sensor applications, it’s likely that a sensor would generate the same message several
times. Each sensor computes R, which is the base point T multiplied by the current random
integer k. Additionally, each sensor computes the multiplicative inverse of k mod p. Each
sensor can now generate its unique signature si . After the signature has been generated,
the sensor proceeds to homomorphically encrypt its reading xi . The sensor first maps its
reading onto the elliptic curve. After the mapping the reading is encrypted using the ECIES algorithm [15].
If the sensor receives messages from other nodes for forwarding, it combines them
according to the algorithm. The signature scheme is designed such that all signatures can
be combined via simple arithmetic. This makes the amount of work required from a parent
very small and thus well suited for wireless sensor networks.

Algorithm 1 Sensor Algorithm
Require: Elliptic Curve Parameters D = (q, FR, a, b, T, p , h), sensor reading mi , private
key zi , base station public key Q, a network wide random integer k
1: Each sensor computes zi ∗ T = (x, y), its public key.
2: Each sensor computes R = (r(x), r(y)) = k ∗ T .
3: Each sensor computes k −1 mod p.
4: Each sensor computes si = k −1 (mi + zi ∗ r(x)) mod p.
5: Each sensor’s signature for the message mi is si .
6: Each sensor maps its reading mi onto the elliptic curve D.
7: Each sensor generates ciphertext mi = enc(mi )
8: if Sensor is a parent then
P
9:
The sensor combines the signatures into s = si )
P
10:
The sensor combines all ciphertexts into one ciphertext mi
11: end if

We will now describe the base station’s algorithm. The base station receives the
sum of the signatures, the sum of the appropriate public keys and the homomorphically
encrypted aggregate result. The base station can now verify that the same sensors that
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contributed to the aggregate also signed their inputs and that signature is included in the
combined signature. The base station first decrypts the aggregate result using its private
key. Additionally, the base station needs to reverse the mapping from the point on the
elliptic curve to the aggregate result. To verify the signature, the base station calculates
a point on the curve using the received signature, the decrypted aggregate result and the
integer k. If the x-coordinate of the point calculated is the same as r(x), the signature is
verified. The base station is now assured that no data not generated by a legitimate sensor
was included in the aggregate.

Algorithm 2 Base Station Algorithm
Require: Elliptic Curve
Parameters D = (q, FR, a, P
b, T, p , h), sum of encrypted sensor
P
readings m =
mi , sum of the signatures s =
si , base station private key qi , sum
of public keys Z, a P
network wide
random
integer
k
P
1: Decrypt ciphertext
mi = mi
2: Map reading m from the elliptic curve D into plaintext.
3: Compute R = (r(x), r(y)) = k ∗ T .
4: Compute w = s−1 mod p.
5: Compute u1 = mw mod p.
6: Compute u2 = r(x)w mod p.
7: Compute X = u1 T + u2 Z.
8: Compute v = X(x) mod p.
9: if v == r then
10:
The signature verified
11: end if

The algorithm described securely calculates the SUM of the readings in a wireless
sensor network. In order to securely calculate the AVERAGE in a wireless sensor network,
the base station needs a count of the number of points included in the SUM. With the
knowledge of how many sensors contributed to the aggregate, the AVERAGE can be
calculated.
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V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our signature algorithm is an extension of the ECDSA. ECDSA is assumed to be
secure. ECDSA has been shown to be secure under the assumption that the underlying
group is generic and that a collision resistant hash function has been used.
Theorem 5.1: 1 The signature produced by summing the individual signatures will
only verify if the contributing individual signatures were produced by a valid node and the
appropriate public key was included in the sum of public keys.
We will now prove that the combined signature will only verify if the individual signatures
contributed are signatures generated by valid nodes and are valid signatures. The value k
is a randomized, synchronized integer used by all nodes in the network. We do not need to
send r(x) with each signature, as the base station is able to compute r(x). Therefore the
unique part of each node’s signature is si .
Lemma 5.2: The sum of the public keys equals the public key generated from the
sum of the private keys.
Proof: We have the sum of the public keys, Z = ZA + ZB + . . .. Let’s say that the
sum of the private keys, z = zA + zB + . . .. Since ZA = zA ∗ T, ZB = zB ∗ T, . . . we know
that
Z = zA ∗ T + zB ∗ T + . . .
≡ (zA + zB + . . .) ∗ T.
Therefore Z = zT . In other words, the sum of the public keys equals the public key
generated from the sum of the private keys.
Lemma 5.3: The sum of signatures produced creates a valid signature equivalent to
a signature produced using the sum of the private keys on the sum of the messages.
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Proof: We know that m = mA + mB + . . . and s = sA + sB + . . ., as per Algorithm 1.
Then
s = k −1 (mA + zA r(x)) + k −1 (mB + zB r(x)) + . . .
≡ k −1 ((mA + zA r(x)) + (mB + zB r(x)) + . . .)
≡ k −1 ((mA + mB + . . .) + (zA + zB + . . .)r(x))
≡ k −1 (m + (zA + zB + . . .)r(x)).
Using Lemma 5.2, it follows that s = k −1 (m + zr(x)).
We can now prove Theorem 5.1, that the signature verification of v == r will only
work if each signer contributed the signature and the matching public key to the aggregate.
Proof: From Lemma 5.3, we know that s = k −1 (m + zr(x)). Rearranging we get
k ≡ s−1 (m + zr(x))
≡ s−1 m + s−1 r(x)z
≡ wm + wr(x)z
≡ u1 + u2 d mod p.
We also know that X = u1 T + u2 Z and that Z = zT ; it follows that
X = u1 T + u2 Z
≡ u1 T + u2 (zT )
≡ (u1 + u2 z)T

Thus (u1 + u2 z)T ≡ kT and r == v as required for the signature verification.
VI. RELATED WORK
Secure data aggregation schemes have been of interest to researchers. The earliest
approaches focused on confidentiality of the data against a single aggregators. Algorithms
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which prevented or detected multiple aggregators colluding to deceive the base station were
also introduced.
A new protocol for provably secure data aggregation in wireless sensor networks was
proposed in [16]. The algorithm guarantees the detection of aggregate modification by the
aggregator, except for those cases where the aggregator injects data into the aggregate. The
algorithm supports any arbitrary tree structure and is resilient to any number of malicious
nodes. The algorithm focuses on the use of the SUM operator, but would also work
with MEDIAN, COUNT and AVERAGE. The algorithm forces a commitment from the
adversary at intermediate nodes. Each sensor also verifies that its data was properly
added to the aggregate. Our algorithm works with any single-path routing protocol, and
will securely calculate the SUM and AVERAGE. Compared to the algorithm in [16], our
proposed algorithm provides for a greater reduction in energy savings due to a reduced
number of messages sent.
The algorithms introduced in [17] achieve concealed data aggregation. Concealment
means that the data and the aggregates are not readable for anyone who is not in possession
of the proper key. The algorithm uses privacy homomorphism to achieve data hiding while
still allowing for data aggregation. The algorithm provides for data confidentiality only; the
authors refer to other papers regarding solutions that provide data integrity and authenticity.
The algorithm uses symmetric keys, while our work uses a private/public key approach.
The protocol introduced in [14] is not meant to provide data authentication and
message integrity during transmission. Rather it is meant to provide persistent, secure data
storage in sensor networks. It provides for secure data replication to ensure data availability
in case of node failure. It also introduces secure data aggregation due to restricted storage
space. Our work uses a similar public/private key homomorphic encryption protocol to
ensure secure data aggregation during transmission.
The work in [11] provides a survey of possible homomorphic public key encryption
schemes suitable for wireless sensor networks. The authors provide a list of desirable
properties of a homomorphic public key encryption scheme for wireless sensor networks
and evaluate the various candidates based on that list. The authors conclude that EC-OU
(Elliptic Curve Okamoto-Uchiyama) and EC-EG (Elliptic Curve ElGamal) are the two
algorithms most suitable for use as homomorphic public key encryption schemes. For
our implementation we have chosen EC-IES, a variant of EC-EG.
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For the work in [18], the authors propose a new additively homomorphic stream
cipher suitable for wireless sensor networks. The proposed algorithms use a symmetric
key stream. In addition to the issues related to symmetric key use, the base station needs
to know exactly which sensor did or did not contribute data to the aggregate. Without this
information the base station will be unable to decrypt the result. Only data confidentiality is
provided with this algorithm. Our algorithm provides both data confidentiality and message
integrity without the limitations of symmetric key cryptography.
As far as we can determine, this is the first work which used additively digital
signatures in wireless sensor networks.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper a novel algorithm is presented to address the problem of secure data
aggregation in wireless sensor networks. We apply a homomorphic encryption algorithm
to the messages to achieve data confidentiality while allowing in-network aggregation. An
additively digital signature algorithm based on ECDSA is used to achieve integrity of the
aggregate. We showed that the signature algorithm is as secure as ECDSA. Future work
will include implementing this algorithm in TinyOS/TOSSIM [19].
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